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This research provides a maturity model for information security for 
healthcare organizations in the United States.  Healthcare organizations are faced 
with increasing threats to the security of their information systems. The maturity 
model identifies specific performance metrics, with relative importance measures, 
that can be used to enhance information security at healthcare organizations allowing 
them to focus scarce resources on mitigating the most important information security 
threat vectors.  This generalizable, hierarchical decision model uses both qualitative 
and quantitative metrics based on objective goals.  This model may be used as a 
baseline by which to measure individual organizational performance, to measure 
performance against other organizations, or to monitor changes in the information 
security environment over time. 
Information security incidents cause significant harm, both financial and 
reputational, to individuals and organizations across the globe.  The cybersecurity 
threat is pervasive and continues to grow at an alarming rate.  This harm is 
heightened in healthcare organizations because human lives may also be at risk in the 
event of an information security incident.  Healthcare organizations have also become 
a popular target with cybercriminals due to the rich trove of personal information 
entrusted to them. Existing information system security frameworks are complicated, 
difficult and time intensive to administer and monitor, and rarely provide relative 
importance of key performance metrics.  Understanding the most important levers in 
 
 ii 
improving information security by introducing a generalizable model can help close 
a gap in the existing literature. 
Using a comprehensive literature review, objectives, goals, and outputs were 
identified and linked together in a four-level hierarchical decision model (HDM).  At 
level 1, the purpose of the HDM is to determine the degree to which the organization 
meets the mission of providing a secure information security environment by 
evaluating a broad set of metrics. Level 2 specifies five objectives, based on industry- 
and domain-relevant research, for the promotion of a secure information security 
environment. Level 3 identifies twenty-two goals with associated measurable 
outputs, characterized by desirability functions, to create level 4. A structured model 
is developed using these linked concepts with the help of subject matter experts to 
validate the content and construct of the model.  The model is further tested by 
measuring for inconsistency and disagreement. 
Using case studies, actual industry data are used to demonstrate how the 
model calculates a score to create a performance measure for each case study 
organization.  Results are discussed to illustrate how the case study sites might 
increase their performance in future assessments against the model. 
This research project contributes to the field by introducing a generalizable 
model and measurement system that compares information security performance in 
healthcare organization to an ideal state.  Healthcare organizations provide critical 
resources to millions every day and must remain operational despite information 
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security threats.  Understanding where healthcare organizations can best direct  their 
limited resources to support stability of their information systems is essential to 
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The healthcare sector has increased implementation of information systems 
dramatically since the advent of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009.  Formerly a laggard in the utilization of technology to support 
enhanced efficiencies and improved business operations [1], ARRA [2] enabled the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide financial incentives for 
the effective use of health information technology (HIT), and beginning in 2015, 
financial penalties for not implementing HIT that demonstrated “meaningful use” [3].  
Largely as a result of this law, HIT has become ubiquitous in the United States.   
The proliferation of HIT has also created a new and significant risk to health 
organizations; protecting the privacy and integrity of large caches of protected health 
information (PHI).  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
of 1996 requires healthcare organizations, known as “covered entities,” to ensure the 
protection of individual identifiable information [4][5]. The Department of Health 
and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR) serves to monitor compliance of 
covered entities with the provisions of HIPAA.  In recent years the OCR has 
dramatically increased their compliance monitoring and auditing of covered entities.  




number and cost of fines to covered entities.  The U.S. Department of HHS OCR web 
site reporting breach activity [6] has become known as the “wall of shame.” 
Settlement fees paid to the OCR totaling nearly $20 million for PHI violations 
were reported in 2016 alone [7].  These settlement fees are a small portion of the 
expense associated with ensuring security of protected health information.  
Organizations can easily invest millions more in securing their information systems 
and, of course, there can be significant reputational harm incurred when a breach of 
protected health information occurs. For example, Oregon Health & Science 
University paid a one-time settlement fee of $2.7M in 2016 for a breach that occurred 
in 2013[8].  As a result of their resolution agreement and three-year corrective action 
plan with the OCR they invested an additional $8M per year in information security 
initiatives for the duration of the corrective action plan.  This same level of investment 
was required to maintain security operations after the corrective action plan was 
resolved. 
As a result of the increased risk factor for information security in a world with 
large collections of protected health information being created, stored, and 
transmitted, many healthcare organizations are making additional efforts to improve 
their information security risk profile.  Healthcare organizations, especially those of 
smaller size, struggle to understand the best use of their limited resources to address 




for guidance - NIST, HITRUST, CIS Critical Security Controls to name a few [9].  These 
frameworks can be unwieldy and most fail to provide guidance on which 
cybersecurity strategies provide the most value.  While there is increasing literature 
examining the problem of the cybersecurity threat in healthcare, there are few 
examples of  program evaluation through quantitative methods based on elements 
identified in traditional cybersecurity frameworks or qualitative case-based methods. 
This study examines the literature to explore the current state of the 
information security environment at healthcare organizations.  It provides value by 
creating a measurement system that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative 
metrics.  A generalizable model is created and validated by subject matter experts 
which produces a score to evaluate overall performance in cybersecurity for 
healthcare organization.  Through a criterion-based validation process, experts agree 
the model may also be used to understand the relative importance of individual 
metrics to aid organizations in understanding which cybersecurity strategies may 
provide the most value in increasing overall performance.  Subject matter experts 
agree that the model accurately reflects performance results and case studies confirm 
this assessment. 
Including this introduction, the paper is organized into 8 chapters.  Chapter 2 
reviews the academic literature on information security in healthcare organizations. 




mitigation strategies are identified, as are cybersecurity frameworks.  Research gaps 
are noted, highlighting the need for a maturity evaluation model. 
Chapter 3 further clarifies the problem and provides information about the 
approach that is taken to provide structure to model development.  Many multi-
criteria decision-making methods are reviewed and the decision to utilize the 
Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) is discussed.  Due to the reliance on subject 
matter experts for validation of the model, important elements of working with 
experts such as formation of research instrument and identification of experts are 
discussed.  
Chapter 4 describes how the hierarchical decision model was developed.  
Initiated by a literature review, and then modified through a validation process 
involving subject matter experts. The validated four-level model links objectives, 
goals and outputs. At level 1, the purpose of the HDM is identified as development of 
a healthcare information security maturity model. Level 2 specifies five objectives: 
organizational support, policies and standards, awareness and training, information 
security technical hygiene, and mitigation of external threats. Twenty-two goals 
populate level 3 with measurable outputs characterized by desirability curves to fill 
level 4 of the model.  
Chapter 5 discusses how the generalizable model was finalized. Subject matter 
experts first quantified the criteria through a series of pairwise comparisons, 




performed to check for individual expert inconsistency followed by an assessment for 
disagreement among experts. The finalized generalizable model is presented.  
Chapter 6 describes how the model is used to demonstrate information 
security maturity within healthcare organizations.   The results are validated by 
subject matter experts.  The model is used to calculate performance in case studies at 
a variety of healthcare organization types.  Scores and metric values are analyzed to 
provide recommendations to a select case study site.   
Chapter 7 reviews the results of the model development as related to the 
problem statement are discussed as well as practical implications of findings. In 
addition, the generalizability of the model is analyzed. Expert feedback responses 
during the model validation process support concerns identified in literature 
regarding severity of threat and need for prioritization of cybersecurity strategies 
given limited resources.  Subject matter experts were in agreement of the validity of 
the model. 
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the discussion, notes contributions to 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
A comprehensive review of information security within healthcare 
organizations was conducted. The body of literature reviewed was selected through 
a variety of methods.  First, literature searches using EBSCO, PubMed/Medline, 
Elsevier, and Science Direct were conducted using key words Information Security, 
Data Breach, Healthcare, PHI, Training, and Organization Culture.  These searches 
were joined in several instances to narrow the results as a means of identifying the 
most relevant literature.  When an article cited a particularly significant prior work, 
that referenced article was also studied.  Search was primarily conducted on articles 
from 2007 to present, but several articles dating as far as 2000 were utilized as 
relevant as well as one article from 1982.  Over 200 relevant articles are cited.   
The rest of this chapter contains six sections.  Section 2.1 identifies 
information security incidents and breaches, highlighting the impact of unsecured 
information. Section 2.2 reviews information security environments and practices, 
noting the practices generally employed to improve the security of information; 
taking a deeper dive into governance, training, management process controls and 
technical controls utilized to improve information security.  Section 2.3 delves into 
the information security environment in healthcare organizations specifically.  
Section 2.4 focuses on existing information security models, frameworks and metrics.  




Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the discussion by summarizing the findings and 
presenting the research gaps. 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the areas considered  in this 
literature review. 
Figure 1:  Literature Review Areas 
 
2.1 Information Security Incidents and Breaches 
Information security incidents and breaches have grown exponentially in 
recent years and have made headlines across the globe.  These threats affect all types 
of organizations large and small, across all industries and across geographic 
boundaries.  During the 2013 Christmas shopping season, a cyberattack on Target 
Corporation’s retail store netted millions of customer’s credit card information [10]. 
In the United Kingdom, a government-sponsored survey found that 87% of small 
businesses had detected and reported cyberattacks [11].  In June of 2015, The United 
States Office of Personnel Management discovered that the background records for 




records of over 21 million individuals [12]. In June of 2021 FBI Director Christopher 
Wray compared ransomware challenge to 9/11 [13].  This is a mere sampling of the 
incidents that have hit the press in recent years.  This sample serves to illustrate the 
significant risk and vulnerability posed by cybercriminals. Of further note, healthcare 
is persistently ranked as the number one target of cybercriminals, followed by 
education, government, retail, financial sectors in varying orders, due to the richness 
of the data available in the healthcare sector [14][15][16].  
The reported volume of financial damage caused by cybercrime has grown 
dramatically across all industries.  Figure 2 below provides details of this loss as 
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center 
[17]. 
Figure 2:  Total reported losses by year in U.S. dollars as reported to U.S. Federal Bureau of 
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Several key factors have driven this growth.  First, there are many more 
systems at organizations, large and small, that store information, than there have ever 
been before.  Second, some of the information stored in this proliferation of 
information systems is highly valuable and as a result the number of cybercriminals, 
and networks of cybercriminals has grown substantially [18]. Third, managing the 
security controls required to protect the information stored electronically is 
expensive, rapidly changing [19], and complex [20]. As a result, many organizations 
across most industry sectors have not, or are simply unable to, establish a strong 
information security environment [21].  Culbertson notes that the volume of threats 
to healthcare organizations is steadily growing, and that mitigating risk to an 
acceptable level will be a massive undertaking [22]. When looking specifically at 
healthcare organizations it should be noted that patient health records contain all the 
information a thief needs to perpetrate identify theft [23]. Agrawal claims that 
continuous data breaches targeting these invaluable medical records have become a 
nemesis for healthcare organizations [24].  Finally, according to HIMSS Analytics over 
80 percent of the security breaches in the healthcare sector since the enactment of 
HIPAA trace back to people within the organization [25][26].  Human behavior and 
simple mistakes, regardless of industry, are a large factor in data loss [27]. 
Information security risks are presented to organizations through multiple 
vectors – system transmission paths, hardware, software, or the internet for example.  




systems, or people (e.g., phishing, malware, zero day exploits, denial of service 
attacks, SQL injections, ransomware, man-in-the-middle attacks) [11][28]. This 
collection of vectors and approaches is rapidly changing and is difficult for most 
organizations to remain responsive to. 
Healthcare organizations need to be mindful not only of patient privacy 
concerns but also of the negative business impacts such as billing theft, identity theft 
or interruption of critical business functions posed by cybercriminals.  The negative 
impact of breaches in healthcare organizations is extreme.  Not only are these events 
costly, routinely reaching beyond seven-figure price tags, but the reputational harm 
can be difficult to recover from.  Most importantly, some information security 
incidents could prohibit the healthcare organizations from providing critical patient 
care activities.   In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware incident not only shutdown 
transportation systems and other governmental systems across the globe, but also 
forced Britain’s public health systems to turn away patients even though no patient 
data was compromised [29]. These incidents not only have the potential of causing 
financial loss to individuals and organizations, but also pose a very real threat to 
healthcare organizations in serving their critical mission of treating patients.  
Clinicians rely on electronic medical records, infusion pumps, and many other tools 
in order to provide the current standard of care [30]. In September of 2020, the first 




transfer between healthcare facilities that had been necessitated as a result of a 
cyberattack at Düsseldorf University Hospital [31].  
2.2 Information Security Environment and Compliance 
The environment of the organization in support of information security has 
tremendous importance in the effectiveness of information security compliance.  
While there are a number of definitions for organizational culture/environment, the 
definition provided by Deal (1982) has often been cited as particularly relevant in the 
evaluation of information security environments.  This specific definition identifies 
the follow key characteristics: 1) shared values, which define the expected behavior 
in the workplace; 2) heroes who have earned distinction by living the organizational 
values; 3) rituals and ceremonies, which are physical expressions of the 
organizational culture/environment; and 4) the cultural social network within the 
organization, which perpetuates the culture/environment and guards against 
deviations [32]. Creating an environment where information resources are protected 
is a necessary component of a successful information security strategy. The 
characteristics identified by Deal are readily mapped to the key criteria of effective 
information security programs as noted below: 
• Technical controls (reinforcing shared values and rituals);  
• Management process controls (reinforcing shared values, rituals, 
cultural network);  




• Governance programs (reinforcing shared values, heroes, cultural 
network).   
These criteria are described in greater detail below.   
2.2.1 Technical Controls 
Technical controls are hardware or software solutions that provide automated 
protection from unauthorized access and misuse of systems and related institutional 
data.  The number and variety of technical controls is vast.  Some may be used to 
mitigate the threat of access to protected data by provisioning and monitoring who 
has access to information across the enterprise (e.g., access/identity management 
and control), others prohibit certain types of information from leaving the 
organization through unauthorized channels (e.g., data loss prevention).  Many 
healthcare organizations deploy data loss prevention (DLP) tools in order to ensure 
that protected health information (e.g., medical record number, diagnosis, social 
security number) does not leave the organization unless they are sent through a 
secure channel.  Other technical control technologies may protect data at rest (e.g., 
encryption technologies).  For example, many institutions both within and outside of 
healthcare, have implemented mobile device management (MDM) solutions to ensure 
that only cell phones, or other mobile devices, that are encrypted access their secure 
networks and that any data on those devices is encrypted and therefore very difficult, 
if not impossible, to access.  Still other technical controls help to facilitate detection 




are more likely to implement technical controls than they are to provide financial 
support for other information security risk mitigation strategies (e.g., training) [33]. 
In many organizations, information security has largely been considered a 
technology issue [34]. However, despite the technology-based measures that are 
generally implemented, there is often little improvement in information security 
compliance behavior [23] and as a result information security remains a problem.  
Organizations tend to design information security solutions by defining a strong 
technical perimeter and keeping intruders out [35]. For best results, technology 
controls must be combined with human solutions in order to create a strong 
environment and defense for information security [36][37]. Technical controls are 
never one hundred percent effective in eliminating information security threats. 
2.2.2 Management process controls  
Management process controls for information security consist primarily of 
policies and sanctions designed to guide, and where appropriate, modify user 
behavior.  
Policies in support of information security cover a broad range of topics from 
appropriate use of computing resources within an organization to specific guidelines 
regarding supported equipment and applications. Policies often fall short of meeting 
organizational objectives if they are not married with procedure level documentation 
to support the “how” of policy compliance or execution.  For example, information 




hardware that was to be introduced to an organization, and many organizations have 
policies requiring such security reviews.  If this policy was not matched with clear 
instructions (procedure level documentation) regarding how an individual would go 
about obtaining such a security review it is likely that employees within the given 
entity would not comply with the policy.  Some regulatory agencies have been known 
to issue fines and/or sanctions (e.g., temporary loss of accreditation) when an 
organization has a policy that is not followed by members of the organization.  It is 
essential that policies are combined with procedures to aid in compliance. 
Maintenance of the large volumes of policies required to provide guidance at complex 
healthcare organizations can be overwhelming, and many organizations are unable 
to commit the resources required to regularly update their policies and procedures 
as frequently as necessary to ensure they remain relevant in the dynamic 
environment of information technology and healthcare regulations.  When policies do 
not maintain relevancy, or are not properly vetted within the organization, they lose 
their efficacy and may even cause greater confusion, thereby increasing the threat of 
unintended information security breaches or policy violations.   
Sanctions are the documented consequences of failure to comply with 
organizational policies. Sanctions are generally aligned with the intent associated 
with non-compliant behavior.  For example, a policy violation may be accidental or 
inadvertent, due to carelessness or negligent behavior, intentional but without 




careless mistake it is likely that the appropriate sanction for violation could be a 
“letter of discipline or warning” delivered to the individual who was non-compliant.  
In the event of a more purposeful or ill-intended policy violation, termination of 
employment status could be called for.  It is important that sanctions be applied 
appropriately in order to provide proper incentives to employees to drive compliant 
behavior.  Organizational members must believe “the punishment fits the crime” so 
to say.  It is equally important that there be no perception of preferential status in 
application of sanctions.  For example, in a healthcare setting a physician must be 
subject to the same applications of sanctions as the nursing staff.  Failure to apply 
sanctions consistently and fairly would result in an ineffective and potentially 
harmful compliance tool.   
When used properly, policies, procedures and sanctions become a powerful 
aid to drive an environment of information security compliance.  Creating a strong 
environment around information security is crucial as users are the largest source of 
breaches despite technical controls [38].  The Online Trust Alliance stated in 2014 
that 29 percent of data breaches were a result of employee actions, either accidental 
or intentional [39]. Further, in many organizations end users are viewed as the 
“weakest link” in information security management [27][40], creating an information 
security gap.  In many healthcare organizations, there is minimal awareness of the 
information security threat, and as a result, staff pose a significant threat to 




User perception of information security is often a barrier in creating a strong 
environment of information security compliance.  Many users are concerned that the 
task overhead imposed by complying with information security measures is 
burdensome and therefore see these measures as a threat.  Users often view 
information security measures as work stressors, privacy invasions, constraining and 
inconvenient.  They feel compelled to maintain their operational performance while 
including information security tasks in their daily work [42][43][44]. Employee 
compliance behavior is critical to ensuring the information resources of the 
organization are protected [18][38]. 
Information security is as much about managing people as it is about 
managing technologies [45][46][47] and access control and authentication systems 
must be simple and easy to use or users will bypass them [48].  It must be recognized 
that there is a tradeoff between usability and information system requirements, and 
this balance must be actively managed [49] if information security systems are to be 
successful. Combining technical controls with human controls provides a strong 
framework for improving and maintaining an environment that values high levels of 
information security. Information security environments influence security 
compliance, security effectiveness, security awareness, and most importantly, 
security behavior [50][51][52][53].  People controls combined with technical 
controls lead to an improved information security environment and a strong 




environment[51][54].   Information security is not merely the responsibility of 
information technology (IT) teams, it is the responsibility of everyone at the 
organization [55].  Even though there is agreement that technological and managerial 
(people) process are both required to be successful, there is a general lack of a well-
developed techno-managerial structure in healthcare [56].  Organizations that have 
employees with a higher propensity for compliance beliefs, as well as a high level of 
executive engagement, and enforcement, are more likely to have a high level of 
information assurance compliance [56][57][58].  It is noted that user attitudes 
toward compliance are affected when they consider compliance-related 
consequences [59]. Management controls govern the behavior of people and become 
stronger over time.  In addition, they become the information security solution with 
the highest value [60] over time as they are cheaper to implement and maintain than 
technical solutions [61]. 
2.2.3 Training 
Policy and sanctions alone are not sufficient and organizations need to employ 
other means such as training to ensure individuals internalize information security 
policies and best practices [62].  Training about information security has become a 
cornerstone of creating an environment that supports information security [63].  The 
creation of an information security environment by educating users about 
information security risks and their responsibilities is essential [64].  As individual’s 




improves remarkably [65]. Karjalainen and Siponen [63] describe effective training 
as being made up of three components: (a) provide elementary characteristics of 
information security; (b) explain how these characteristics support the information 
security training; and (c) create models on how to evaluate training.  
Some of the elementary characteristics of information security which users 
must be aware of are the need for data integrity, authentication and confidentiality 
requirements.  Data integrity, simply put, is trust in the information that is being 
presented to users in the conduct of their daily tasks. That information, or data, must 
be not only trusted as a valid source of record, but also be consistently available when 
access is needed.  Authentication and confidentiality are also key components in 
information security, ensuring that only those individuals who should have access to 
data are provided that access.  These elementary characteristics are the “what” 
component of the training – as in “what is it that we want to talk about?” 
The next key component of effective training programs is the “how.”  Providing 
employees with information about specifically how their actions can improve 
information security within the organization is essential.  For example, a common 
threat vector to information system integrity and confidentiality is phishing.  Phishing 
is the action of sending an email, either broadly to all potential victims within an 
organization or specifically targeting high-profile/high access individuals (spear-
phishing) within an organization.  Phishers design their emails with the intent of 




devices or to otherwise provide their personal information or credentials to them. 
They do this by masquerading as trusted conveyers of the request for information 
(e.g., institutional information technology department, financial institutions).  While 
there are some technical tools that can minimize the volume of phishing emails, there 
will certainly be some phishing emails that get past those technical controls.  When 
that happens, it is critical that individual users know what characteristics are 
common of phishing emails so that they do not become victims of phishers.  
Organizations must therefore train their employees to mitigate this risk which can 
negatively impact both the organization as well the individual user. 
Training programs should be multi-dimensional in order to be successful.  
Individuals have different learning styles, and effective training programs respect and 
cater to those differences.  Multiple delivery channels and venues are needed.  
Computer-based training is an effective tool for many and it provides fairly reliable 
mechanisms for tracking training comprehension, through testing embedded within 
the training, as well as tracking of training at the individual level across the 
organization (i.e., who has completed the training and who has not).  However, 
computer-based training is not always the best training for increasing a deep level of 
understanding or for evoking understanding at an emotional level.  Many individuals 
are more likely to understand the content being delivered it they are able to do so in 




There is some evidence that greater success in information security awareness 
can be found with small group training workshops and discussion activities as 
opposed to more standard top-down messaging or large presentations with no 
opportunities for interaction [65][66][67]. Further, positive motivators may be more 
effective in attaining information security compliance than stringent enforcement 
[23]. In addition, positive peer influence on compliance [44], security values and 
attitudes of the users are re-informed by the consistent behavior of senior 
management and their peers toward these security values [68].  It’s possible that 
these peer attitudes would become more pronounced in the small group 
environment.  For these reasons, and many others, a diverse and multi-dimensional 
training program is key to success. 
Training and education will be more effective if it outlines not only what is 
expected of individuals and how to prevent information security breaches, but also 
provides an understanding of why it is important, thereby influencing attitude 
[69][70][71][37].  Without the knowledge of why information security is important 
introducing stringent information security measures could be perceived and 
attributed to a lack of trust toward the users which could significantly increase 
internal user information system abuse [72].  Conveying information about the 
impacts of breach of patient’s medical records or other personal information about 
employees or affiliates of the organization is required.  Employees must understand 




that criminals may use the information to cause harm, both reputational and financial, 
to individuals.  Security practices should be supported by an organizational 
environment that not only improves security awareness but also enhances the 
individuals' motivation to act responsibly and in accordance with policies [73][74]. 
Finally, the success of information security training programs must be 
measured as a key component of the overall success of information security 
compliance.  Due to the complicated nature of combining technology solutions and 
human management solutions as the framework of an effective overarching 
information security program, isolating the success of training program alone may be 
a challenge.  Certainly, competency-based testing is one avenue of measuring 
knowledge gained and therefore the success of training programs.  However, 
measuring employee performance in the conduct of practicing effective information 
security is quite another. The overall interest in measurement of information security 
training has increased significantly in recent years, although no definitive model for 
doing so has yet been identified. 
2.2.4 Governance 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines 
information security governance as the process of establishing and maintaining a 
framework to provide assurance that information security strategies are aligned with 
and support business objectives, are consistent with applicable laws and regulations 




responsibility, all in an effort to manage risk [75].  Typically information security 
governance programs have the following foundational criteria:  1)  governing the 
ongoing operations of the organization’s information security technology framework;  
2) governing the conduct of employees in ensuring compliance with information 
security policies and procedures; 3) ensuring adequate funding is available for the 
execution of information security programs; 4) ensuring compliance requirements 
are met, often through monitoring by outside or unrelated organizational entities; 
and 5) protecting organizational reputation.   
Most information security governance programs obtain feedback and report 
results across multiple levels within the organization.  Given the large reputational 
and financial damage than can be wrought by poor information security management 
practices it is important that the highest levels within the organization are informed 
of the risks and mitigation programs related to information security.  Equally 
important is a “boots on the ground” understanding of the business impact of 
decisions related to implementation of information security solutions.  The 
technologists must understand workflows within the enterprise well enough to 
deliver solutions that will not severely hamper the ability for individuals to conduct 
their daily tasks in the interest of improving information security.  In addition, 
information security best practices suggest a separation of duties between the 
owners of the technology solution operations and the auditing of performance against 




distinct reporting channels within an organization.  For example, information 
security engineering might sit within the information technology department, while 
information security auditing might sit within the compliance or legal department of 
a given organization.  These multi-level and multi-channel approaches are key criteria 
of successful information security governance programs. 
2.3 Assessing Information Security Environment in Healthcare 
There has been significant research documenting the volume of breach 
activity and likely threat vectors.  Figure 3 below illustrates the increase in volume of 
healthcare breaches of more than 500 records from 2009 to 2020 as reported to the 
HHS Office for Civil Rights [76].  In 2020 those breaches resulted in over 268,189,693 
records being inappropriately disclosed [76]. 














In addition, there is a fair amount of research on which specific industries are 
being impacted by breaches and the cost associated with those breaches.  Figure 4 
[77] below illustrates the average total cost of a data breach by industry for 2020 in 
U.S. dollars.  The average cost of a healthcare breach is $7.13M, higher than the 
average total cost of a data breach in any other sector, and nearly double the global 
average cost regardless of industry.  The research cited below in Figure 4 excluded 
very small and very large breaches, capturing only those that ranged in size between 
3,400 and 99,730 compromised records and included costs associated with detection 
and escalation, notification, post data breach response and lost business. 
Figure 4: Average total cost of a data breach by industry for 2020 in US$ millions. 
 
This cost data, when combined with information about the number of 
healthcare breaches noted in Figure 3 exceeds an annual cost above $4.5B and this 






















number underestimated the total cost as it excludes the cost of very small and very 
large breaches. 
Clearly the threat is rising, especially in the healthcare sector, and the cost of 
breaches is disproportionately high for healthcare organizations.  The problem is well 
documented, but more research is needed in identifying solutions to better manage 
the risk.  There is little research addressing the promotion of compliance behaviors 
within organizations [23] and more research is required in the health profession to 
understand motivating behaviors for adoption of an information security 
environment [78]. 
An understanding of organizational environment related to information 
security compliance can significantly aid in the execution of a successful information 
security program.  The following measures have been identified as being helpful in 
assessing information security environments:  security awareness, security 
ownership, top management support and influence, information policy enforcement 
and security training [79].  There appear to be mixed findings in the research related 
to environments of information security awareness and compliance in healthcare 
systems.  Alumaran, Bella and Chen found that human behavior toward protection of 
medical information is one of the main threats to information security; and that the 
current environment in healthcare falls short in protecting health information due to 
"values and norms" toward information security [80].  However, Hasib [81] and 




Canada and found fairly high levels of confidence in a high level of information 
security compliance and environment. This dichotomy of opinion serves as the 
context for further inquiry into the question of how to measure information security 
compliance effectiveness and attitudes, and further the impact of organizational 
environment in shaping the adoption of a strong information security practices. 
Organizations that recognize the value of committing resources, and enhancing 
capabilities and cultural value in the face of organizational issues can enhance their 
performance [82]. 
2.4 Information security models and metrics 
In order to prepare for, and respond to, information security threats models, 
also known as cybersecurity frameworks, have been developed and refined over the 
years in order to identify information security best practices.  Information security 
models and metrics were recognized on the Hard Problem List of the United States 
INFOSEC Research Council in 2005, a situation confirmed by the United States 
National Science and Technology Council in 2011 and further supported as one of the 
five hard problems in Science and Security in 2015 [83]. The next few pages explore 
existing models and associated metrics and suggests how those models could be used 
as a foundation for creation of an information security maturity model for healthcare 






 2.4.1 Information Security Models 
Information security’s key objective is the protection of Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability of data, often referred to as the CIA triad, without impinging 
on organizational productivity [84]. In order to best serve this objective in a 
systematic way, the development of information security models and metrics began 
in the 1980s and has continued to evolve since that time.  The Information Security 
and Control Association (ISACA) has defined the following key outcomes 
for information security governance [85]. 
• Strategic Alignment – Security requirement defined by the business 
enterprise.  
• Value Delivery – Baseline security following best practices.  
• Risk Management – Delivering to agreed-upon risk profile.  
• Performance Management – A defined set of metrics that are 
consistently measured.  
There are numerous information security models currently in use with similar 
but not identical desired outcomes documented and similar, but not identical, 
methodologies proposed.  There are a great number of models that assess 
information security risk.  Some of these models are qualitative in nature and others 
are more quantitative [86][87]. A few have become standards, however there is no 





Maturity models are instruments that define an evolutionary path to 
increasingly meeting the defined objective.  General maturity models have been 
widely used in information systems research [91].  Maturity models have also been 
used in the healthcare domain specifically in the information system sector 
[92][93][94].  In the case of information security, the defined objective would be 
defined as an environment that has robust controls to mitigate information security 
risk as aligned with organizational business objectives. Models must be simple 
enough that organizations of all sizes can measure their maturity as well as develop 
action plans to improve maturity levels.  This is a significant challenge with 
existing models.  Listed below is a brief description of the most prevalent information 
security models that are considered standards.  
Information Security and Control Association (ISACA) COBIT 5 for 
Information Security [95] –   The Information Security and Control Association 
(ISACA), an international association of professionals focused on information 
technology governance, developed the Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technologies (COBIT) in 1996. The original model was largely focused on 
governance and processes associated with technology delivery.  In 2012 ISACA 
released an add-on for COBIT 5 specifically related to information security.  The 
model is high level and is largely audit and compliance focused with an accreditation 




International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27000 series (also 
known as ISO/IEC) [96] –  The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
is a consortium of national standards institutes across more than 150 countries.  ISO 
has developed an information security framework and associated code of practice 
documentation in their 27000 series.  ISO’s 27000 series was first published in 
2005 and was based on the United Kingdom Government’s Department of Trade and 
Industry standard for information security, referred to as BS 7799.   Most recently 
updated in 2014, it can be viewed as an overall program that combines risk 
management, security management, governance and compliance.  The standard is 
largely compliance focused and has an associated certification process available.  
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  800 series 
including CyberSecurity Framework [97]–  The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology is a non-regulatory federal agency within the United States Department 
of Commerce. NIST has developed information security standards and guidelines to 
increase the planning, implementation and management of information 
security.  NIST’s 800 series was first published in 2002 and the most recent 
cybersecurity framework document was published for feedback in 2017.  Developed 
to support private sector organizations, it does not offer a certification program but 
rather is a self-assessment tool.   
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Assessment 




Mellon University for the United States Department of Defense, OCTAVE was first 
published in 1999.  OCTAVE is primarily a high-level risk assessment 
methodology designed for organizations with more than 300 employees.  The focus 
of OCTAVE is on identifying threats and vulnerability and then developing strategies 
to mitigate those threats.  OCTAVE does not offer a certification process and is free to 
use.  
Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) CyberSecurity Framework 
(CSF) [99]- The Health Information Trust Alliance is a not-for-profit collaborative of 
healthcare, technology and information security leaders in the United States.  In 
2009 HITRUST developed the Common Security Framework in an attempt to 
harmonize the multiple existing standards and respond to regulatory requirements 
associated with healthcare organizations. HITRUST is compliance focused and 
available free of charge, although the certification process is fee-based.  
Each of these models were developed to meet specific objectives [86]. While 
most of the models have common themes their specific objectives, steps, structure 
and level of application vary considerably.  Table 1 below provides a summary of the 









Table 1: Comparison of Information Security Standards  








COBIT [95] 1. Align, Plan, Organize 
2. Build, Acquire, Implement 





4. Requirements & 
Documents 
7 N/A 
ISO 27001 [96] 1. Define Methodology 
2. Identify Assets 
3. Identify Threats & 
Vulnerabilities 
4. Qualify Risk 
5. Mitigate Risk 
6. Document Risk Report 
7. Review, Monitor, Audit 
N/A 18 124 
NIST 800 series  
[97] 
1. System Characterization 
2. Threat Identification 
3. Vulnerability Identification 
4. Control Analysis 
5. Likelihood Determination 
6. Impact Analysis 
7. Risk Determination 
8. Control Recommendations 








OCTAVE 5 for 
Info Sec [98] 
1. Establish Drivers of Risk 
2. Profile Assets 
3. Identify Threats 
4. Identify and Mitigate Risks 
N/A 10 N/A 
HITRUST [99] 1. Prioritize and Scope 
2. Orient 
3. Create a Target Profile 
4. Conduct a Risk Assessment 
5. Create a Current Profile 
6. Perform Gap Analysis 
7. Implement Action Plan 




As illustrated in Table 1 above, the variety and depth of the models covers a 
broad spectrum, from light-weight to very detailed.  This variety is also apparent in 
the approach each of the standard models uses when considering definitions of 
maturity as illustrated in Table 2 below.  
Table 2. Comparison of Maturity Model Levels  
Model  Maturity Levels  
COBIT Model [95] 1. Non-existent  
1. Initial/ad hoc  
2. Repeatable but intuitive  
3. Defined process  
4. Managed and measurable  
5. Optimized  
ISO 27001  [96] Not documented  
NIST 800 * [97] 1. Partial  
2. Risk Informed  
3. Repeatable  
4. Adaptive   
OCTAVE [98] Not documented  
HITRUST CSF 2009 [99] 1. Basic  
2. Aspirational  
3. Developing   
4. Integrated  
* Identifies tiers but also explicitly states “does not necessarily represent maturity level” [97] 
NIST [97] notes that “organizations will continue to have unique risks – 
different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances.”  This interest in 
flexibility is common in the models described above; however, the lack of 
consistency of approach, evaluation and measurement across the models creates 




whole searching to fill the gaps left by each respective model and without a common 
nomenclature or benchmarks.  As a result, there has been significant independent 
research on model variants or completely new models developed in the past several 
years.   Figure  [5100] below provides a snapshot of the increase in systemic review 
of cyber-resilience assessment frameworks from 2006 through 2019. 
Figure 5:  Standard Risk Assessment Process  
 
This increase in development of new models, despite existing standards is 
largely driven by two key factors.  First, increased utilization of technology 
has heightened the visibility and importance of information security.  Second, 
frustration with existing models due to their gaps and complexity has driven 
individuals to create new models that better suit their specific needs.   Table 3 below 
provides a summary of information security models that were identified in the 




Table 3: Information Security Models Identified in Literature Outside of Standard Models  
 
Existing models, while somewhat divergent as illustrated in Table 1, 
generally follow a risk assessment theme with an approach as noted in Figure 6 [121] 
below; however, they largely lack the detailed action level objectives for 











Figure 6:  Standard Risk Assessment Process  
  
The healthcare sector, while recognizing the need for flexibility, is in need of 
more specific guidance related to information security [99].  Barlette [122] notes that 
many organizations may be skeptical about information security effectiveness due to 
the difficulty in evaluating the benefits.  In addition,  most if not all existing standard 
models lack any metrics associated with changing information security culture [70] 
or human behavior [123],  which is a significant gap given the prevalence of security 
incidents associated with human error.  Compliance is evolving from a focus on 
technical controls to one that includes the human element in the context of coherent 




lack certainty [125][126] and may be difficult for small organizations to utilize [122] 
due to lack of expertise. 
2.4.2 Information Security Metrics 
Metrics can be used to provide performance indicators for organizations 
against some defined goal.  They may also be used to compare and differentiate 
performance across different organizations. Effective utilization of metrics can help 
organizations in measuring and monitoring their performance outcomes.  
Information security metrics should tell organizations how well they are 
doing in keeping institutions safe from harm, how they can improve their security 
posture, and how they compare with others in the field when it comes to information 
security.  According to Brotby [127] contemporary metrics largely fail in this 
regard.  Most information security metrics are focused on technical controls 
[86][128] and say little about overall security.  While technology is important, it is far 
from the only element that is necessary in providing an environment with high levels 
of information security [20][129].  Due to the confidential nature of information 
security, very few organizations are willing to share information about their 
information security profile with others [129], making comparison of standards and 
maturity exceedingly challenging.  
Metrics are more than a list of things to be counted or boxes to be checked 
off.  In the case of information security, they should be used to tell a story about 




a quantitative and objective basis for security assurance [126].  Their main uses fall 
into the following broad categories:  
• Strategic planning – assessment to support decision making and 
program planning.  
• Quality Assurance – product development lifecycle and vulnerability 
management.  
• Tactical Oversight – monitoring for compliance and improvement 
opportunities.  
It is critical that organizations define specific objectives if they are to create 
meaningful metrics.  Nearly all current models measure risk components as “red”, 
“yellow”, and “green”.  They often do this by assessing each risk element against two 
key factors – probability of event occurring and impact of event should it 
occur.  While this bucketing of risks and measurement provides flexibility for 
organizations, it does not always provide quantitative, specific and actionable 
information. Healthcare organizations specifically have difficulty prioritizing the 
work that may be required to remediate risks [124]. As noted by Black [130] one 
problem with the current metrics is that they lack specificity of definition.  For 
example, if the information security metric is defined as “percentage of systems 
patched” would that mean only operating system patches or would it include service 
and application patches?  NIST notes that the concepts of fundamental units, 




been applied to information technology [126].  Difficulty in measurement is a 
common challenge in information security metrics which makes benchmarking 
challenging as well.  Another common problem with existing model metrics is the 
accuracy of qualitative measures.  In many instances, especially those involving 
metrics related to information security culture [102][131][105] self-evaluation 
surveys are employed for measurement over time.  Such surveys often produce 
inaccurate or skewed results, depending on the nature of questions asked [130]. 
Good metrics are SMART – Specific, Measurable/Manageable, Actionable, 
Relevant, and Timely/Trending as illustrated in Table 4 [132][133]below.  
Table 4:  SMART Metrics 
Specific  Clearly define target and area of 
measurement.  
Measurable/Manageable  Data can be obtained consistently and 
efficiently.  
Actionable  Provides information that is easy to 
understand and provides direction 
about improvement opportunity.  
Relevant  Measurement is related to objective 
and importance.  
Timely/Trending  Can be compared over time.  
  
SMART metrics are lacking in current models for information security. Black 
[130]  notes that current models provide many suggestions for the types of metrics 
that should be collected for information security but no definitive list has been 




documenting measurement, however they have only provided a few examples of 
what these measures and metrics might be [121]. Further, little work has been done 
to determine the value of the metrics in operational environments [134] nor have 
specific measures been defined for the metrics that have been suggested.  
2.5 Maturity Models in Healthcare and the Benefits of Certification 
Lacking consistent and effective maturity models for information security, we 
look to maturity models that have been developed in healthcare for other 
purposes.  The HIMSS Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model (EMRAM) is such a 
model.  HIMSS EMRAM was designed to identify the various stages of maturity in the 
area of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) for hospitals.  The maturity model, shown 
below in Figure 7 [135], consists of 8 stages and provides a recommended adoption 













Figure 7:  HIMSS Analytics US EMR Adoption Model  
 
 
Beginning with Stage 0, where the EMR alone is installed, to full maturity at 
Stage 7 which includes characteristics such as Continuity of Care Documents 
(CCD) readily available. The model offers a certification process that ensures that the 
next higher level is only reached upon completion of clearly documented measures 
within each stage.  
The model was developed in 2005 and has been refined over time. It, along 




optimization of EMRs rapidly.  The model has provided a clear path for the logical 
evolution of EMR adoption, providing not only a roadmap for hospitals of all sizes, but 
also a means of benchmarking best practices across the country [136].  The model is 
now used in many countries around the globe and the benefits of this model have 
been widely reviewed and include increased efficiencies in clinical staff quality 
performance [137] as well as improved patient safety [138].  There are similar 
models in support of maturity in healthcare analytics [139], but neither of these are 
appropriate for measurement of healthcare information security maturity. 
Models that offer a certification process, such as ISO, COBIT, and the HIMSS US 
EMR adoption model noted above, offer numerous benefits to industry and well as 
independent organizations.  The following key benefits of certification have 
been noted [140][141][142]:  
• 87% of respondents stated that ISO 27001 had a “positive” or “very 
positive’ outcome on their information security.  
• 82% of those surveyed noted an increase in quality control of 
information.  
• 39% reported a decrease in down-time of IT systems and the same 
number a decrease in the number of security incidents.  
• 78% reported an increased ability to meet compliance requirements.  
• 44% reported increased sales or competitive advantage.  




2.6 Findings, Recommendations and Gaps in Literature 
The literature reviewed confirms that information security is a significant risk 
to healthcare organizations.  Further, when organizations understand their 
information security maturity they are better positioned to ensure protection of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of their data, avoiding costly information 
security incidents which cause both financial and reputational harm.  
The role of user motivation and attitude in information security, while 
recognized, has not been treated seriously [143].  Despite user training, information 
security compliance remains problematic [144] and more research should be done to 
explore what types of learning are most effective.  Additional research must also be 
done to determine what instills a strong information security environment in 
organizations [145][146].  Further, not all groups within an organization will react 
similarly to the same initiatives for promoting security awareness [147]. Studies 
which specifically examine the human component of information security are needed 
[148].  All to these factors distill to a core theme around a neccesity for further 
research in defining the current state of information security environment within 
organizations and ways in which that environment might be improved. 
There is a significant gap in information security models that provide a 
maturity score, clearly defined metrics, and recommendations that may be used as a 
roadmap for healthcare organizations.  Many authors suggest the need for new 




[142][149][150].   There is a specific need in the industry to provide a maturity model 
that is easy to understand and provides clear direction regarding prioritization for 
investment of information security resources.  A new model is required that, while 
not replacing existing models or comprehensive risk assessments, would provide a 
framework of best practices for healthcare organizations of any size.  Such a model 

















CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.1 Research Problem 
Healthcare organizations are faced with increasing challenges in 
implementing and sustaining high-functioning information security environments.  
These challenges will continue to increase as regulatory monitoring increases and 
information security threats persist.  Focusing on improving the information security 
environment within these organizations is likely to help provide protection of 
protected health information (PHI) and personal information as well as support the 
continued operations of critical business functions including the very critical mission 
of providing urgent life-saving care.  
Consistent performance evaluation and management leads to increased 
performance – what is measured matters.  Current information security evaluation 
programs exist, but are complicated, resource intensive, difficult to use and as result 
are not used [151][152].  The ability to adequately measure information security 
performance against peers or manage performance over time in a quantitative way is 
a significant challenge.  
Healthcare organizations have limited resources and must be diligent in the 
execution of funding decisions.  Given the growing investment in information security 
at healthcare organizations, decision support tools that clearly define the tactics that 
will have the biggest impact on improving performance would allow for objective and 




to measure performance over time, answering the question “was the promised value 
achieved?” 
An easy to use, generalizable model, that provides a holistic set of metrics with 
performance scores for information security maturity is much needed. 
3.2 Research Scope and Objectives 
This study presents a new holistic approach in the evaluation of information 
security maturity at healthcare organizations.  This index can help organizations in 
developing strategic, practical and effective methods for improved information 
security behaviors.  Once deployed within an organization, a baseline compliance 
score would be created.  The index score could then be used to compare maturity with 
an ideal, with other organizations, or to monitor progress toward an enhanced 
maturity of the information security environment over time.  Further, it could be used 
to deepen understanding of the mechanisms that will improve the environment of 
information security.  In this way, organizations may learn not only from the conduct 
of an individual assessment, but may also have a means of learning from others in 
similar or diverse organizations, experiencing the same information security 
challenges. 
A number of diverse healthcare organizations are used to test and analyze the 






This research has four objectives: 
1. Define a set of outputs that create a balanced and comprehensive image 
for information security maturity; 
2. Develop a framework and metrics that gauge performance evaluation 
related to these outputs; 
3. Evaluate performance of a variety of healthcare organizations using 
this framework; 
4. Introduce a new method for healthcare organizations to measure 
performance, extending the literature. 
Figure 8 maps the gaps to research questions that were developed leading to 
research objectives noted above. 






3.3 Multi Criteria Decision Problem 
Providing a solution to the complex issue of improving information security in 
healthcare organizations is clearly a problem that requires a multi criteria approach 
to decision making.  In order to understand the best method for evaluating the 
maturity level of information security environments, many well documented 
approaches to multi criteria decision analysis were considered prior to selection of 
Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM).   
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is often used to analyze complex 
problems when a single optimal solution does not exist.  MCDA is defined as “a set of 
methods and approaches to aid decision-making, where decisions are based on more 
than one criterion, which make explicit the impact on the decision of all the criteria 
applied and the relative importance attached to them” [153].  Often time the criteria 
may be related to one another and decision making may  require trade-offs. The 
typical process for MCDA begins with definition of the problem at which time the 
objective and types of decision are identified.  Next a number of criteria are defined 
for the conduct of evaluating alternatives.  This is followed by validation and 
weighting of both the criteria and model itself.  The process is concluded with 
performance of sensitivity analysis and ultimately a prioritization of alternatives.  







Figure 9:  Idealized Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Process  
 
According to Thokala [154], Adunlin [156], and Drake [157] there has been an 
increase in utilization of MCDA methods in healthcare as it provides a sound and 
rigorous approach to decision making.  There are numerous examples of research 
that has used MCDA to address healthcare questions [154][156][157][158][159] 
[160] and volumes have been increasing since 2011. As a specific example, Marsh 
used MCDA as a decision support tool for determining fields of approval, assessment, 
pricing and utilization of new drugs and medical technologies [161].  In addition 





MCDA Modeling Approaches MCDA approaches can be broadly classified into 
value measurement models, outranking models, and goal programming models.  
Value measurement models require construction and comparison of numerical 
scores, representing value, to identify the degree to which one decision is preferred 
over another.  The use of individual weighted scores of criteria to create an overall 
score for each alternative solution is provided.  Outranking methods generally involve 
pairwise comparison of alternative criteria which are then combined to create a rank 
order set of alternatives. Goal programming entails searching for the alternative that 
most closely matches minimum levels of performance acceptance [166].  Below the 
methods in each broad classification are discussed in more detail. 
3.3.1 Value measurement methods 
Value measurement methods require the construction and comparison of 
numerical scores (individual and total value) to represent how one alternative is 
preferred over another [161][167]. The aggregation rule for these models usually 
uses a weighted sum approach. As shown by Marsh [161] and colleagues [167], value 
measurement is the most common MCDA approach. Examples of these methods are 
described below.  
Additive Aggregation - Additive Aggregation is simple linear aggregation and 
is a common MCDA approach. In this approach each score on each criterion is 
multiplied by its weight and then the weighted scores are summed for the overall 




Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) – AHP uses expert knowledge to create a 
hierarchical structure for systematic alternative selection and justification problems. 
AHP decomposes a difficult MCDA problem into a systematic hierarchy procedure 
[168] then utilizes experts to prioritize the importance of individual criteria. AHP 
assumes each criterion evaluated as independent of other criteria.  AHP askes experts 
to use an eigenvector method , where a linear transformation is created stretching 
the X-Y line chart, during the prioritization process.  Decision-makers are usually 
more comfortable giving interval judgments than absolute value judgments. Using 
feedback from experts, a matrix is prepared, indicating the relative importance of 
criteria and alternatives for consideration.   
Analytical Network Process (ANP) – ANP is a general form of AHP.  The key 
differentiator between AHP and ANP is that unlike AHP, ANP allows for consideration 
of interdependence among criteria. 
Hierarchical Decision Modeling (HDM) - HDM is a well-known tool that helps 
provide a framework for quantifying subjective information so that effective 
qualitative judgements may be made for decision-making purposes [169][170][171].  
HDM breaks down complex issues into key components that can be singularly 
identified and measured at the individual level with respect to criteria across multiple 
levels of the hierarchy.  Components are broken down into pairwise comparisons 
segments, where industry experts can evaluate their relative preference of one 




sum approach requires experts to provide a numeric and relative value among 
options to largely qualitative questions.  The researcher can then validate each 
expert’s opinion with other experts, thereby validating the evaluations. The key 
differentiator between AHP and HDM is that AHP uses the eigenvector method for 
creating values whereas HDM uses the constant-sum method. 
Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) – MAUT considers additive value for 
multiple objectives [172] considered “bundles”. AHP and HDM are sometimes 
considered MAUT methods [173].  The MAUT process considers the perspective of a 
decision maker through the use of utility functions or desirability curves.  One of 
MAUT’s strengths is that it accounts for uncertainty. 
Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) – PBMA is a framework 
that helps decision-makers to reallocate resources so that benefits are maximized 
[174].  Developed specifically for healthcare decision analysis, PBMA has eight stages: 
choose a set of meaningful programs; identify current activity and expenditure in 
those programs; identify improvements; weigh incremental costs and benefits;  
prioritize; consult  and consider changes; effect the changes; and evaluate progress 
[174].  The decision maker is providing as much information as possible related to 
the relative size of gains and losses related to reallocation and divestment of 
resources.  PBMA addresses the issue of allocation efficiency, maximizing the benefits 





3.3.2 Outranking methods 
Outranking methods are based on a general concept of dominance using an 
outranking relationship.  Using pairwise comparison to prioritize criteria [154] for 
the purposes of determining which alternative outranks another in relative 
importance.  Strict dominance, where one criterion is rigidly preferred over another 
given criterion, is a requirement within these methods. Examples of these methods 
are described below. 
Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE) – ELECTRE is a method 
for selecting the best choice, the choice with the greatest advantage and the lowest 
level of conflict among criteria [176][177][178].  Sometimes known as the French 
school of decision making, it was originally developed in 1965 by Bernard Roy.  
Different versions of ELECTRE have been developed over time including ELECTRE I, 
II, III, IV and TRI.  ELECTRE I is intended for problems of selection, ELECTRE II, III, 
and IV are intended for problems of ranking, and ELECTRE TRI is intended for 
assignment problems. All methods follow the same basic concepts however they 
differ according to type of problem and operational execution. ELECTRE requires 
construction of one or more outranking relationships by first comparing pairs of 
actions followed by coordination of indices based on information obtained in the first 
phase.  During the process some alternatives are eliminated which don’t meet the 




Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment of Evaluations 
(PROMETHEE) – PROMETHEE is an outranking method that provides a framework 
for decision making focused on conflicts and synergies and clusters of specific actions 
[179].  PROMETHEE uses generalized criteria to facilitate inclusion of uncertainty.  
According to Hyde [180] PROMETHEE is executed by identification of stakeholders, 
selection of criteria, formulation of alternatives, weighting the criteria, assessment of  
the performance of alternatives against the criteria, selection of the generalized 
criterion function and associated indifference and preference values for each 
criterion, sensitivity analysis, leading to a final recommendation.  
Geometrical Analysis for Interactive Aid (GAIA) – GAIA is an extension of 
PROMETHEE which provides graphical representation of the problem [181].  GAIA 
strives to provide decision makers with information about the relationship between 
criteria and alternatives [182]. 
3.3.3 Other Methods 
Other methods aim to identify the alternative that best meets a predefined 
level of achievement [183][161].  Using a mathematical formulation of the 
satisfactory heuristic, a model that may not be optimal but is generally acceptable 
[158]. The satisfaction model is focused on achieving a defined level of satisfactory 
performance for each criterion by considering the preference of criteria in their order 
of importance. The levels represent the ‘goals’, while an algorithm is used to identify 




thought of as an extension of linear programming that handles multiple, and 
sometimes conflicting measures.   
Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solutions (TOPSIS) - 
TOPSIS is based on the concept that the chosen alternative should have the shortest 
geometric distance from the positive ideal solution (PIS) and the longest geometric 
distance from the negative ideal solution (NIS) [185][186][187].  A series of 
comparisons of these relative distances provides the preference order for the 
alternatives. FUZZY TOPSIS method is sometimes used to evaluate the criteria in each 
region and then all the criteria may be ranked based on the region [188]. 
3.3.4 Advantages and Limitations of Predominant MCDA Methods 
The above listed MCDA methods have been applied widely across many 
industries and for diverse problems. The Table 5 below illustrates a summary of the 












Table 5:  Advantages and Limitations of Predominant MCDA Methods 
 
The table above identifies classification of MCDA methods as derived from 
Thokala and Duenas [184], Ishizaka and Nemery [189], and Belton and Stewart [190]. 
Other less popular methods are found in literature related to MCDA. Only 
predominant methods have been identified in the preceding pages. 
Most methods have seen improvement and evolution over time. Utilization of 
outranking methods, like ELECTRE and PROMETHEE, which were prevalent early on 




approaches such as AHP and MAUT have increased.   Recently combining different 
methods has become commonplace in MCDA. The combination of multiple methods 
addresses deficiencies that may be seen in certain methods [191].  Specific user needs 
and decision problems must be evaluated to determine which MCDA approach is 
most appropriate to use [161].  
3.3.5 Appropriateness of HDM Combined with Delphi for Research 
When considering the appropriateness of HDM for the proposed research the 
following questions were considered: 
• Is the proposed methodology an effective method for assessing the 
findings in literature related to information security programs in 
healthcare such that a maturity index could be created? 
• Is the proposed methodology appropriate for assessing the multiple 
criteria that are necessary for development of a mature information 
security environment? 
• Does the proposed methodology allow for criteria with varying levels 
of importance? 
• What level of effort is required to obtain necessary information to 
build the model and is access to the necessary resources attainable? 
• Has the proposed methodology been proven successful in conducting 
similar research or varied research in the same or similar industries?  




HDM is a way of documenting the framework for analysis of a given system.  
There are several benefits to using HDM for analysis and decision-making purposes.  
HDM permits complex issues to be presented to key stakeholders in understandable 
ways by illustrating relationships among key criteria in a given decision.  In the case 
of HDM, the model allows for an easily understood aggregation of literature reviewed 
and expert feedback, presented in a quantified manner with the intention of 
presenting viable options to decision makers.   
Strengths of HDM as a research method are as follows: 
• Provides a comprehensive abstraction of problem under 
consideration; 
• Illustrates multi-level relationships among elements of model; 
• Aggregates the opinions in an easy to digest way for decision 
makers; 
• Structures both qualitative and quantitative data in a single view;  
• Allows for variability of value for each criterion within the model; 
• Allows experts to express relative preference as opposed to 
ultimate preference; 
• Constant sum model with scoring 0-100 is easily understood by 
experts; 
• Experts can be engaged at a moderate effort level; and 




The mixed research methodology combining Hierarchical Decision Modeling 
(HDM) and Delphi Method is well-suited to the proposed research.  Obtaining 
validated sources of data related to information security is challenging due to both 
limited prior research in this field as well as the confidential nature of information 
security work in general.  Information security professionals and organizations do 
not freely discuss their risks and vulnerabilities for fear that those weaknesses will 
be exploited.  Similar challenges have been faced by others in the emerging 
technology space.  Gerdsri and Kocaoglu applied Delphi method to collect data from 
industry experts in order to validate strategic information about emerging 
technologies [192]. The Delphi method is used when basic demographic, economic or 
historical information is inadequate to conduct desired research [193][194].  Delphi 
is a way of structuring communication among a group of experts such that they are 
able to contribute their expertise independent of one another, so as not to be unduly 
be influenced by one another.  The key characteristics of Delphi are as follows: 
• Anonymity – members of the group are not aware of the specific 
composition of the group. 
• Iteration – members of the group are asked questions in several 
stages and are often allowed to change their opinions in each stage. 
• Group Analysis – at each iteration the group’s responses are measured 





Using this blended approach allows for dynamic discussion panels to be used 
in constructing the original hierarchy and defining criteria as findings of literature 
review are validated by mutual agreement of experts, followed by Delphi, a means of 
providing anonymous feedback, which aids in mitigating the potential bias created by 
strong personalities for actual quantification of the criteria within the HDM.  Phan 
states that “…this process (HDM) makes the experts more comfortable because their 
decisions are based on the relative preference of one criterion over another rather 
than an absolute preference” [195].  Further, HDM is an effective method for this 
specific research in that it allows for both qualitative as well as quantitative data to 
be incorporated in the model [196]. HDM is effective at illustrating multi-level 
relationships and posing alternatives in a systematic and quantitative way [197].   
HDM has demonstrated success as an appropriate methodology for evaluating 
multi criteria decisions [195][197][198].   HDM has been used to provide frameworks 
for solving research questions in strategic planning [197][199][200][201], healthcare 
[202][203][204][205][206], organizational change [207] and technology fields 
[208][209][210][211][212][213][214][215][216][217][218].  In a recent and 
relevant example Phan used HDM to calculate an innovation index for sustainable 
technology [195].  
Given the well-documented success of HDM across industries and problem 
types, the complex nature of the research problem and the effective mitigation 




the issue of creating a maturity index for information security in healthcare 
environments.   
3.4 Expert Judgement 
Utilization of expert panels in creating models for complex decision making, 
where limited quantitative data is available, is broadly supported in the literature 
across many industries [154][158][159] and specifically in the healthcare industry 
[155][219][220].   
Experts are individuals who have deep knowledge of a specific skill or area 
and are not likely to be challenged by others.  Fink [221] defines experts as 
“representative of their profession, have power to implement findings…not likely to 
be challenged as experts in the field…”. McKenna [222] defines as “a panel of informed 
individuals’, therefore the “expert” title is applied. It is important to identify the 
criteria by which you determine the composition of the expert panel prior to the 
conduct of research [223].  ISC2 , an international organization that provides the 
industry standard in information security credentials, defines an information security 
expert as having the following qualifications [224]: 
• Advanced theoretical knowledge proven by international 
certifications; 




• Ability to communicate with all levels, according to their level of 
understanding, from board level to end-user; 
• Ability to find solutions which are not in books and prioritize them; 
• Ability to view the risks beyond the obvious and act upon - be 
proactive and not reactive; and 
• Ability to choose a solution which represents a fair trade-off between 
security and usability. 
3.4.1 Validation 
Expert panels are used to validate the constructs, content and relative 
importance of criteria within multi-criteria decision models as shown in Table 6 
below [225]. 
Table 6:  Summary of Expert Panel Application to Model 
Validity What is measured Methods 
Construct The degree to which a measure 
relates to expectations formed 







Content Degree to which the content of the 
items adequately represents the 





Degree to which the criterion can 








3.4.2 Selecting Experts 
Careful consideration is required selecting experts to ensure that they will be 
relatively impartial when providing feedback as well as be up-to-date on current 
knowledge and perceptions in their field of expertise [226].  The relationship among 
experts as well as the relationship of experts to particular organizations should be 
carefully considered when developing expert panels.  By definition, experts are 
intimately familiar with the given topic and as such may be biased, or perceived to be 
biased, based on their industry relationships.  As an example, in the case of 
information security experts, an expert that worked for a particular software vendor 
could be perceived as providing feedback through the research process that if enacted 
would drive business back to the organization that employed them.  Bias may also be 
introduced if experts are permitted to discuss research questions with one another.  
Strong voices or personalities in the community may influence the thinking of a panel 
of experts thereby skewing the feedback received.  Additionally, experts must be 
provided some level of flexibility in their ability to provide feedback.  A rigid feedback 
structure (e.g., structured survey without option for additional feedback) could be 
limiting and as such would not take full advantage of the experts’ knowledge.  Finally, 
the ability to access experts in some fields, especially emerging fields, and the 
willingness of those experts to participate in research activity may be limited. 
When identifying experts and forming panels it is important to recognize that 




As such a variety of expert panels, with varying perspectives and skills sets, may be 
required for a single model.  For example, in the case of researching the development 
of an information security maturity model for healthcare organizations, it might be 
appropriate to have the highest level of information privacy and security experts (e.g., 
Chief Information Officer or Chief Integrity Officers) be on the panel that validates the 
mission level of the hierarchy.  Responding to questions like, “Does this mission 
statement make sense?”, “Is this question worthy of research?”  A second panel could 
be identified to validate the objectives that are most likely to measure information 
security maturity.  This panel might consist of Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISOs).  Further, a number of smaller panels could be developed that would focus on 
each of the goal level criteria, and yet another to focus on strategic level criteria.  It is 
likely that some of these smaller panels would consist of Certified Information 
Security Professions (CISSPs) who have deep knowledge of technical solutions.    
The size of expert panels should also be considered when developing research 
models.  There are varying opinions on optimal panel size.  Okoli and Pawlowski [227] 
propose that a panel of 10 to 18 members produce the best results, while others [228] 
suggest that 6 to 12 member panels produce optimal results.  Small expert panels 
have been shown to effectively produce valid results using Delphi method 





Information may be gathered from experts through a variety of methods.  
Common approaches are surveys, interviews, group processes, individual meetings 
and Delphi.  Regardless of method, researchers need to provide experts with a 
comprehensive and easily understood research background, clear instruction on 
perspective or parameters of the questions being posed, and instructions related to 
measurement of response, as well as any other information that might ensure reliable 
responses from experts. 
3.4.3 Inconsistency in Expert Judgements 
As part of the model modification process inconsistency and disagreement 
among experts must be considered. While experts provide valuable insight to criteria 
selection and evaluation, their input is subjective, and as such, the opinions of specific 
experts may change or vary over time resulting in inconsistency in expert 
feedback.  Inconsistency can be defined as disagreement within an individual’s 
responses.  For example, suppose an expert was asked to compare three modes of 
transportation when going to the grocery store: (a) riding a bike, (b) walking, and (c) 
driving.  The expert responds that he prefers riding a bike to walking (a>b) and 
walking to driving (b>c).  If the expert later responded that he preferred driving to 
riding a bike (c>a) this would demonstrate an inconsistent response.  In this 
illustration the inconsistency would be labeled ordinal, the general order of 
preference.  Ordinal consistency does not take into account the level of preference 




when responding to prioritized choices.  For example, an expert might be asked how 
much they prefer riding a bike when compared with walking (e.g., 2X), and how much 
they prefer walking to driving. (e.g., 3X).  In this example, if asked, the expert would 
have to respond that they preferred riding a bike to driving by 6X otherwise cardinal 
consistency, or the level of preference, would be violated.  It is worth noting that if 
cardinal consistency is satisfied, then ordinal consistency is satisfied as well, but the 
inverse is not true.  
The importance of measuring and managing consistency in Hierarchical 
Decision Models (HDM) is critical.  Kocaoglu’s research [219][232][233] provides a 
clear definition of inconsistency and  uses a variance-based approach for calculation 
of inconsistency in HDMs.  Further, Kocaoglu recommends a 10% limit above which 
the reliability of expert feedback would be considered questionable.  At the 10% level 
or greater expert feedback may be unreliable, as consistency of response is a critical 
factor in acceptance of feedback into the model.  This recommendation is consistent 
with Saaty’s [198] proposed consistency ratio with an upper limit of 10% for 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) models.  Portland State University’s Department 
of Engineering and Technology Management has created ©HDM software [234] 
which calculates inconsistency in experts compared against the 10% threshold 












Any value which exceeds the 10% threshold would be worthy of deeper 
examination. 
A new model for measurement of inconsistency in HDM was recently 
proposed by Abbas [235].  This new model provides a more flexible and less 
conservative approach to the standard 10% threshold recommended by Saaty and 
Kocaoglu. Abbas posits that the 10% threshold is overly conservative and that 
acceptable levels of inconsistency can be measured using the Root Sum Variance 
(RSV) method illustrated below.  In Abbas’ model the number of decision elements 
and alpha (α) level are linked for the purposes of evaluating the soundness and 
validity of the judgment.   







2is the variance of the mean of the ith decision element, 













  𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the normal relative value of the variable i for the jth orientation in 
nth factorial orientations; 









When inconsistencies are identified in expert opinion the most important 
mitigation strategy is to carefully review the process by which the research is 
administered as well as review of the research instrument itself to ensure quality, 
clarity and consistency of information presented [236].  For example, if an 
inconsistency were identified for a specific expert, the researcher might re-run the 
analysis without that individual expert’s contribution to determine if the overall value 
of the criteria changed. If the overall value of the criteria did not change then it would 
be appropriate to assume the expert’s inconsistency did not negatively impact the 
model.   Utilization of Delphi method also helps provide a measure of control such 





3.4.4 Disagreement Among Experts 
In addition to the potential risk for inconsistency in expert feedback when 
using HDM, it is also possible that there will be disagreement among the experts.  It is 
not altogether uncommon for experts to disagree.  This could be due to a number of 
factors including professional or personal experiences of individuals.  There are also 
issues that could cause disagreement among experts based on research design.  Some 
disagreements may simply be the outcome of misunderstandings of individual 
experts.  It is important to understand the key drivers leading to disagreement and to 
clarify any potential misunderstanding. Clarity and level of detail provided in the 
questions posed to experts is critical in mitigating the risk of disagreement. The risk 
of disagreement may also be mitigated by ensuring that each expert panel is assigned 
at the appropriate level in the decision model.   
In order to determine if disagreement among experts exists two statistical 
methods are commonly used:  Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC or ric) and F-test 
with hypothesis testing.  ICC provides an assessment of the degree to which all 
experts agree by comparing the means among the judgements of experts to determine 
high or low disagreement between the range of zero (0) and one (1).  Zero represents 
absolute disagreement and one represents ultimate agreement.  A value of >.07 is 
considered strong agreement [238][239].  The formula for ICC is provided below: 
𝑟𝑖𝑐 =
𝑀𝑆𝐵𝑆 − 𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑆𝐵𝑆 + (𝑘 − 1)𝑀𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
𝑘






MSBS is the mean square between decision elements, 
MSres is mean residual square, 
MSBJ is the mean square between experts, 
k is the number of experts, 





















𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐽 − 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑆  
𝑑𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠 = (𝑛 − 1)(𝑘 − 1) 

























In order to increase confidence of assessment of disagreement Shrout and 
Fleiss [240] propose conducting a hypothesis testing procedure (F-test) as well.  The 
null hypothesis (H0) would indicate significant disagreement among experts.  Each F-
value is calculated and compared against the F-critical value to determine if the null 
hypothesis can be rejected.  If H0 is rejected, it can be concluded that no significant 
disagreement is present among experts.   F-value and F-critical values are computed 
readily using the ©HDM Software created by the Engineering and Technology 
Management Department at Portland State University. 
Is disagreement among experts is identified using the techniques described 
above, the Hierarchical Clustering Method (HCM) may be used to identify individuals 
or groups that are similar.  Analyzing these grouping can help to determine the cause 
of disagreement and in some cases identify groupings of experts that create better 
alignment.  Hogaboam [220] used HCM techniques to create sub-groups within her 
expert panels that diminished disagreement on specific panels while leaving model 
alternatives unchanged.  
The techniques described above allow for disagreement to be identified and 
analyzed by comparing similarities and differences among sub-groups of experts.  
Analyzing the cause of disagreement can provide valuable information to inform the 




3.5 Research Approach 
It is clear from the literature review that due to the complexity of the issue a 
multi-criteria approach to decision making and evaluation of effectiveness of 
information security environments is required.  It is also important to note that much 
of the information available to evaluate this issue is not publicly available due to the 
inherent risk associated with sharing information security knowledge relative to 
individual organizations.  Further, current evaluation of the criteria that are typically 
identified as important to a strong environment of information security have been 
judged so through a qualitative process and have not been quantified.   
The structured process illustrated in Figure 10 below was designed to guide 
this research.  







Key steps of this process are discussed below: 
Model Development and Validation – Conduct a comprehensive literature 
review to define the key objectives, goals and outputs related to information security 
maturity and develop a generalizable model which represents appropriate 
relationships among these elements.  Use panel of industry experts to validate model 
for information security maturity. 
Data Collection and Analysis – Utilize validated model to design research 
instrument to quantify data and create desirability curves by obtaining expert 
judgement.  Analyze data for inconsistency and disagreement levels. 
Validate and Test – Validate and test research instrument by conducting case 
studies to obtain metrics from representative healthcare organization.  Analyze and 
document results. 
3.5.1 HDM as a framework 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was introduced by Saaty [198] as 
multi-criteria decision model (MCDM) capable of deconstructing a problem into 
hierarchical levels of linked components. The Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) is 
similar to AHP in providing a hierarchical approach to problem solving but differs in 
using a constant sum approach to quantifying judgements as opposed to the 
eigenvector approach used by AHP.  HDM is well-known for providing a framework 
for quantifying subjective information so that effective qualitative judgements may 




the ability to quantify expert judgement thereby incorporating both structured and 
unstructured data into the model. HDM breaks down complex issues into key 
components that can be singularly identified and measured at the individual level 
with respect to criteria across multiple levels of the hierarchy.  Components are 
broken down into pairwise comparison segments, where industry experts can 
evaluate a level of preference of one criterion over another as opposed to declaring 
an absolute preference.  The constant sum approach requires experts to provide a 
numeric and relative value among options to largely qualitative questions.  The 
researcher can then verify each expert’s opinion with that of other experts, thereby 
validating the proposed model and documenting values across multiple opinions. 
HDM models have been broadly used to compare technology options for decades. 
Phan [171] used HDM to create a framework of determining the level of 
innovativeness within organizations in the semi-conductor industry.  Gibson [240] 
utilized HDM to create a measurement system for evaluating the performance of 
engineering and science research centers. Tran [225] used HDM to develop an index 
to measure the effectiveness of a technology transfer office based upon fulfillment of 
the stated mission.  Estep [241] developed a technology transfer score for evaluating 
research proposals using HDM.  These researchers effectively used the HDM method 
to construct measures of effectiveness in fields where data is both qualitative and 




Introduced by Cleland and Kocaoglu [232] in 1981, HDM is well-suited for 
evaluation of a problem based on mission, objectives, goals, strategies, and 
activities/actions (MOGSA).  Figure 11 [219] below is a generalized form of the 
MOGSA framework typically utilized in developing HDMs. 
Figure 11:  Generalized Hierarchical Decision Model 
 
The purpose of the model is placed at the top of the hierarchy at the “mission” 
level.  Organizational “objectives” associated with the mission are located at the next 
lower level in the model.  “Goals” associated with each objective are documented in 
the third level of the model, followed by “strategies” related to the defined goals.  
Measurement of the desirability of strategies leads to the creation of a number of 
actions or alternatives that might be considered to meet the stated mission.  In the 
case of developing an index for measuring information security maturity, various 




strategies will certainly contribute more than others to the overall maturity index.  
The relative value of each strategy will be determined by experts. 
Experts will be utilized at various stages of the research process.  When 
collecting expert feedback to validate the model’s content and construct a structured 
Delphi process will be used. 
3.5.2 Delphi 
The Delphi method in an iterative multi-step process designed to elicit expert 
opinions and achieve group consensus from different stakeholder perspectives 
[242][243][244]. Delphi is a popular method used in healthcare research 
[222][223][245]. The initial research instrument used for model validation will 
include the opportunity for experts to provide qualitative feedback, which will then 
be fed back to the experts in subsequent assessment [223].  The Delphi method is 
used when basic demographic, economic or historical information is inadequate to 
conduct desired research [193][246]. Delphi is a way of structuring communication 
among a group of experts such that they are able to contribute their expertise 
independent of one another, so as not to be unduly influenced by one another. The 
Delphi method and the HDM are frequently combined when using expert panels to 




3.5.3 Desirability Curves 
A comprehensive review of literature identified objectives, goals and 
strategies as key elements required to measure the maturity of information security 
within any given organization.  A generalizable model was developed and presented 
to experts for validation of content and construction. 
Estep, Gibson, Phan and Tran [195][26] [240][241] all used desirability curves 
in the conduct of their research.  The purpose of desirability curves is to identify how 
“desirable” or valuable a specific metric is to decision makers.  Estep [241] used the 
mathematical representation below when incorporating the influence of desirability 
curves in creating a healthcare information security maturity score: 
 
Desirability curves will be used in conduct of future research when a 
comprehensive model is prepared. 
3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, two measures of sensitivity analysis must 




Inconsistency is related to individual expert’s responses when responding to 
quantification of the model.  In general, inconsistency should be measured at less than 
10% for valid results.  Disagreement among experts must also be measured.  Experts 
are likely to have some variability in responses across expert populations, but there 
should be general consistency to validate the model.  If disagreement is identified, a 
deeper analysis must be conducted to determine the cause of disagreement and 
appropriate mitigation efforts should be employed.   
3.5.5 Challenges and Mitigation Strategy 
There are two notable challenges associated with the proposed application of 
HDM.  First, as the number of criteria for evaluation increases, quantification of each 
criterion can become difficult.  Second, as new technologies are identified the whole 
series of judgement measurement may need to be repeated.  In order to mitigate this 
challenge a composite index, sometimes called a “technology value”, will be 
developed by combining the relative values of each strategy along with desirability 
scores for each strategy.  In doing so, a semi-absolute value for each strategy’s impact 
on the named objectives will be created and utilized instead of a relative value [247].  
3.5.6 Limitations of Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) with Delphi 
The research uses a Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) to assess the ways in 
which an information security maturity index is created for healthcare organizations.  




apply weighting to said criteria.  In this way, HDM provides a comprehensive view of 
the issue under consideration in a way that is easily understood by decision makers. 
Like any multi criteria decision model, HDM has both strengths and 
weaknesses.  The key limitations of HDM are noted below. 
Risk of using experts to validate and quantify model.  While utilization of 
experts can be extremely valuable where quantitative data is hard to obtain, there is 
risk of both inconsistency in expert feedback and disagreement among experts.  This 
risk can be mitigated with sensitivity analysis and the strategies identified previously.  
In addition, results of expert opinion are highly subjective and experts are sometimes 
difficult to access.  Careful selection of experts and reliable access to industry experts 
is required to mitigate this limitation. 
Risk associated with pairwise comparisons. The number of pairwise 
comparison required to describe the issue in a comprehensive way can be significant.  
This can not only be a deterrent to expert participation, but can also cause fatigue in 
experts leading to rushed or not well considered feedback [248][249]. This risk was 
mitigated by careful structure of the expert panel groups and by limiting the number 
of comparisons in each iteration.  In addition, the framework of collecting data (e.g., 
pairwise comparisons) can be considered restrictive.  This risk was mitigated by 
careful validation of the criteria of the hierarchical model prior to quantification of 
the model, including providing paths for experts to provide unsolicited feedback at 




Risk of overgeneralization.  There is a tendency for HDM to be thought of as a 
solution rather than a model to be used to inform decisions.  It must be made clear 
that the model is not a specific answer to a given problem but rather a tool to be used 
by decision makers. 
Durability of model over time.  HDM is well suited to complex issues in 
emerging fields.  However, that specific fit also poses a risk as these emerging fields 
may be rapidly changing.  This model will need to be revisited over time to ensure it 
remains relevant. 
3.5.7 Identification of Information Security Experts for Panels 
Experts are a valuable resource to the research community.  There are a 
number of well-known methods for identifying industry experts.  Some of those 
methods are identified below. 
Snowball sampling uses a small pool of initial contacts to identify other 
participants who meet the eligibility criteria and could potentially contribute to a 
specific study [250]. The term "snowball sampling" reflects an analogy to a snowball 
increasing in size as it rolls downhill. This method of acquiring experts is best used 
where it is difficult to identify experts but has limitations in that it is non-random and 
has a high incidence of community bias. 
Citation analysis is a method of identifying experts based on an analysis of 
citations of published documents [251].  This popular and long used method of 




subject, but it is less valuable when there may be a limited number of experts 
published in emerging fields or when operational industry knowledge is required. 
Social network analysis is a method of identifying experts by mapping 
relationships among individuals, web pages, organizations and other connected units 
of measure [252].  Nodes in the network analysis are individuals and groups 
associated with key identifying labels (e.g., information security).  While effective at 
identifying relationships that may not be readily apparent, it can also present 
anomalies and as a result is sometimes less reliable and requires additional validation 
[219]. 
National expert databases may be purchased from a variety of sources.  These 
databases are culled from numerous sources and generally sold for the purpose of 
sales leads. While they may be used as a source of information to define industry 
experts they are often out of date, non-granular and expensive to acquire. 
Professional organizations are yet another source for identifying subject 
matter experts that may serve as resources in expert panels.  Most professional 
organization rosters have the benefit of self-affiliation.  In other words, individuals 
identify themselves as experts in a given field and seek to join these organizations in 
order to be part of a community of interest to share best practices, access to one 
another, and up-to-date industry information.  It can be challenging to gain access to 




organizations do not provide lists of their members to others, some do provide access 
to list of members but often this is provided at a substantial fee. 
For the conduct of this research, this researcher has the benefit of access to a 
number of professional organizations in both the information security and healthcare 
information technology fields.  Below is a list of some organizations that could be 
accessed to identify experts in information security. 
CompTIA is a non-profit trade association, dedicated to advancing the 
interests of IT professionals and IT vendor organizations. They provide education, 
certifications, advocacy and philanthropy as well as networking opportunities for IT 
professionals.  https://www.comptia.org/ 
EC-Council is a member-based organization dedicated to providing resources 
to information security professionals.  The organization provides training standards 
for education and certifications as well as forensic resources.  
https://www.eccouncil.org/# 
GIAC – Global Information Assurance Certification is a professional 
organization focused on certification of information professionals.  
https://www.giac.org/  
ISACA is a non-profit organization committed to providing information on 
development and adoption of information security best practices to professionals in 




(ISC)2 – International Information System Security Certification is an 
organization that specializing in providing certification to information security 
professionals.  Their Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP) is the 
industry standard.  https://www.isc2.org/  
ISSA – Information Systems Security Association is a non-profit, member-
based organization dedicated to providing a community of best practice for 
information security professionals. They provide educational forums, publications 
and peer interaction opportunities. http://www.issa.org/ 
In addition to the professional organizations identified above, focused broadly 
on information security, there is also a single professional organization specifically 
focused on information security professionals in the healthcare industry.   
AEHIS – Association for Executive in Health Information Security 
http://www.issa.org/ was founded in 2014 and offers a professional development 
and networking forum for Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), and other top-
ranking information security leaders, in the healthcare sector.   AEHIS provides 
educational resources, networking opportunities and other resources related to both 
information security and information privacy.  Although it has a brief history, it was 
created by CHIME, the College of Health Information Management Executives 
https://chimecentral.org/ , an organization that brings 25 years of experience as the 
industry leading professional organization for healthcare information technology 




send member-to-member surveys to CHIME and AEHIS members.  CHIME currently 
has more than 3,000 members.   
CHIME and AEHIS members are ideal candidates in the development of expert 
panels for the conduct of research associated with developing a maturity model for 
information security in healthcare organizations.  As such, due to researcher’s access 
to CHIME and AEHIS database as a member of CHIME, these organizational 
membership lists served as the foundation  of all expert panels.  In addition, a number 
of panel members were identified through social networks of the researcher. 
3.5.8 Expert Panel Development 
This study used a multi-stage process where a total of fifty-one selected 
experts formed six discrete panels to validate, and then quantify, model elements. 
Many experts met the criteria to serve on multiple panels and agreed to participate 
in such.  A seventh panel was created to validate and quantify metrics of desirability. 
An original candidate pool of 214 potential experts was culled from the CHIME 
members (3,337) and AEHIS membership (900) lists as noted above.  Care was taken 
to ensure that no more than one person from any given healthcare organization was 
identified as a potential participant, that all experts held a title of either Chief 
Information Officer, Chief Privacy Officer, or Chief Information Security Officer, and 
that they remained employed in the field of health information security.  In addition, 
experts were selected from a variety of healthcare organization types: academic 




mid-size stand-alone community hospitals, large healthcare systems and integrated 
delivery networks.  Finally, experts were selected with the objective of broad 
geographic representation across the United States in mind. 
An invitation was sent to all candidates requesting participation in the 
research study.  The invitation identified the researcher as both a student and a 
colleague in order to obtain greater likelihood of participation.  Those that agreed to 
participate received consent forms, a summary of  the proposed research and 
targeted research collection instruments.  A copy of all research instruments is 
provided in Appendix A. 
Of the fifty-one consenting subject matter experts, thirty-five were Chief 
Information Officers (CIO), five were Chief Privacy Officers (CPO), and eleven were 
Chief Information Security Officers (CISO).  A comprehensive list of experts, identified 
by organization type but not specific affiliation in order to protect confidentiality, can 
be found in Appendix B-2.  Each panel was created taking into consideration the 
specific skill set of the given subject matter expert.  For example, expert panel P1 was  
used to validate the literature based HDM.  CIO, CPO and CISO experts were selected 
for participation in this panel due to their broad knowledge of information security.  
These experts assessed the overall landscape of information security and the 
objectives and goals that have influence on the stated mission of the model.  As 




roles for multiple functions: validation, quantification, and development of 
desirability curves. 
Figure 12:  Expert Functions 
 
A comprehensive list of each panel is provided in Appendix B-1. 
3.5.8 Data collection and analysis approach 
As noted earlier in this chapter, Delphi method was used to facilitate data 
collection for the conduct of this research.  This method uses a series of surveys to 
obtain feedback at controlled intervals in a structured way from a variety of 
perspectives.  This method was used to validate the construction and content of the 
HDM model.   For example, in phase 1 of this research expert opinion was obtained 
using well-defined yes/no acceptance to validate model criteria.  Agreement rate of 
80% is acceptable [234]. This model’s strength is a transparency which leads to 
consensus; however, it can inhibit unique feedback.  In order to mitigate this concern, 
an open text box was provided to experts to facilitate collection of additional feedback 




Once the model has been validated each element must be quantified.  For this 
second phase of research experts were presented with pair-wise comparisons 
through a carefully designed online quantification instrument provide by Portland 
State University Engineering Management Department’s HDM software.  The HDM 
software uses a constant-sum method for allocating 100 points between two model 
elements.  Distribution of the 100 points provides a relative importance under the 
parent element.  The values are then normalized relative to each related element. The 
process results in an overall value rating for each element with respect to the linked 
objective in the decision model.   
The HDM software also provides analysis for inconsistency and disagreement 
as discussed previously.  Research instruments and data collection are provided in 
Appendix D. 
3.5.10 Case studies 
Five case studies were developed to illustrate how the model calculates a score 
and how these scores can be used to conduct a comparative analysis and develop a 
roadmap for improvement of the information security environment. The following 
organization types were identified as case study candidates in order to confirm the 
maturity model was appropriate for both small and large healthcare organizations. 
• Critical Access Hospital 




• Integrated Delivery Network 
• Large Healthcare System (more than one hospital and over 500 beds) 
• Academic Medical Center 
Case studies were conducted through interviews with highest level 
information technology executive at each site.  The results of case study were 
presented to  experts to determine the degree to which the model effectively reflected 
the actual performance of each site.  Ideally an external evaluation of case study 
results would be conducted, however the confidential nature of information security 
and the lack of publicly available data related to information security makes such an 
assessment infeasible at this time.  Gibson successfully utilized the approach of expert 
self-assessment in her study related to the development of a measurement system for 










CHAPTER 4: HDM DEVELOPMENT 
 
The hierarchical decision model (HDM) provides a flexible and stratified  
structure for decision making. The purpose of the model is to determine the maturity 
level to which a given healthcare organization has created a strong information 
security program. It is a generalizable model that outputs a performance evaluation 
score for a healthcare organization by evaluating a comprehensive set of metrics.  
At the top of the model, the objective is the organizational maturity score.  At 
the second level, objectives represent areas or categories of information security 
protection. At the third level, goals are identified which relate to each information 
security objective.  Finally, desirability curves are used to measure each goal.  The 
remainder of this chapter documents the model elements, their links to one another, 
and shows how the generalizable model is constructed. 
4.1 Objectives 
The following five information security objectives were identified: 
1. Organizational support for information security; 
2. Information security policies and standards; 
3. Information security awareness and training; 
4. Information security technical hygiene; and  




These objectives were derived by exhaustive review of existing literature 
related to cybersecurity, feedback from experts and by review of the cybersecurity 
frameworks themselves such as NIST [97], HITRUST [99], CIS [253], ONC [5].  Each of 
the five objectives is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.  
4.1.1 Organizational support for information security 
Organizational support is a key pillar of successful information security 
programs and can be defined as a high level of support for information security, 
including support at the Board level of the organization.  Support is demonstrated by 
engagement and understanding of information security risk by modeling behaviors 
and by provision of financial support.  The original model was modified from 
“leadership support” to explicitly named “Board of Directors” level support based on 
feedback from subject matter experts.  As seen in broadly publicized recent 
information security incidents at healthcare organizations, such as the incident at 
Scripps Health [254], the potential for reputational harm to organizations who 
experience information security incidents is high. 
4.1.2 Information security policies and standards 
Information security policies and standards are of critical importance to any 
cybersecurity framework and are especially important in highly regulated healthcare 




and procedures, update them routinely, and make them available to all users of 
technology are likely to have a more robust information security environment. 
4.1.3 Information security awareness and training 
Human behavior is a significant factor in information security environments 
[27].  When workforce members possess an understanding and acceptance about the 
need for all organizational members to protect information assets, organizations are 
better positioned to have a mature information security environment.  Through 
diverse training and awareness events, organizations can share information with 
organizational members about the risks and risk mitigation strategies related to 
information security and thereby improve their performance.  During the model 
validation process two subject matter experts called out the need to reinforce the 
notion of “shared accountability”- i.e., information security is not a singular  IT 
responsibility but rather it is everyone’s responsibility. This is a common theme in 
speaking with information security professionals.  In order to incorporate this 
feedback into the model this objective definition was modified to reflect this interest.  
4.1.4 Information security technical hygiene 
Information systems require active system maintenance in order to prohibit 
information security vulnerabilities.  Organizations that implement technology and 
process controls to maintain system health are well positioned to minimize their 




technical hygiene is the foundation of information security best practices, as is well 
documented in all cybersecurity frameworks [96][97][99][253]. 
4.1.5 Mitigation of external threats 
External information security threats are pervasive [255], as recent 
cybersecurity incidents in healthcare organizations [29][31] illustrate. Organizations 
with mature information security programs implement technical controls to mitigate 
external threats.   These tools help organizations understand when restricted data 
may have left the organization, minimize incoming spam, which may be phishing 
attempts, and prevent and detect unauthorized users from accessing an 
organization’s network. 
The original HDM model consisted of a single goal related to technology 
controls; however, given the high volume of expert feedback received, the original 
goal of “technical controls” was split into two goals 4.1.4 and 4.1.5, information 
security technical hygiene and mitigation of external threats respectively.  The high 
volume of feedback is unsurprising given the vast number of technical controls 
available and the technical orientation of the subject matter experts. 
4.2 Goals and Outputs 
Each of the five objectives noted above has either four or five associated 
measurable goals. As the model was finalized the Delphi method was extremely useful 




well as identifying new goals where it is required to ensure a comprehensive model.  
Each of these goals is documented below with appropriate details where the model 
changed over time to response to the feedback of subject matter experts. 
4.2.1 Organization Support - Governance 
Established governance processes are key components of existing 
cybersecurity frameworks [97] and are critical in shining a spotlight on the risks 
associated with poor information security in healthcare organizations including 
compliance risk [50][55].  Robust governance systems also aid in assuring that 
information security solutions are mindful of needs of the business to continue to 
operate.   A framework to provide assurance that information security strategies are 
aligned with business objectives as well as applicable laws and regulations is 
fundamental to a successful information security program. 
All subject matter experts agreed that a comprehensive governance structure 
is required, with the exception of one SME who did not think governance was 
required upon initial evaluation of model.  Follow up was provided by this expert 
which indicated that they believed that governance, while “not unimportant, was the 
least important of the goals identified under the organizational support objective”. 
4.2.2 Organization Support - Leadership and management 
Information security professionals have long faced the challenge of engaging 




security culture.  Often information security is thought of as the responsibility of 
technology professionals as opposed to the responsibility of all at the organization.  
Technology alone will not provide the level of protection required.  Strong support 
from leadership and management, including organizational Board members, who are 
engaged in understanding information security risk [75] and model behaviors to 
protect organizational assets is an important driver in culture change and 
sustainability of effective information security programs.   A regular review of key 
performance indicators by leadership ensures that the philosophy of consistent 
improvement is embedded in information security programs [50][65].  
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of this goal and 
requested the definition be explicit about the importance of board engagement. 
4.2.3 Organizational Support - Resource availability 
Information security programs require diverse resources in order to be 
successful – people, tools and community engagement [50][53].  Most healthcare 
organizations are woefully under-resourced to respond to the current cyberthreat 
landscape [256].  Successful programs must have assurances that adequate financial 
resources are available to support information security [256], including dedicated 
information security resources.  While closely linked to governance and leadership 





Subject matter experts agreed that resource availability was worthy of a 
discrete goal within the model.  Two experts noted that dedicated information 
security resources were required and as a result  the goal description was revised to 
include this clarity in definition. 
4.2.4 Organizational Support - Risk assessment, risk management, 
disaster recovery and incidence response 
Regular risk assessments are a foundational element of existing cybersecurity 
frameworks [79][253] and are specifically called out by the office of the national 
coordinator for health information technology’s guide to privacy and security of 
health information [5].  The companion product to the risk assessment is a risk 
management plan, providing the ability to manage known organizational risks [257]. 
Subject matter experts broadly agreed with the inclusion of risk assessment 
and risk management plan as a model criterion.  They also suggested that disaster 
recovery and associated incident response plan where appropriate to include within 
this portfolio of assessment and response tools.  The model and associated definition 
were revised to include these interests.  
In summary, the suite of tools required to support a mature information 
security environment within the context of organization support are an unbiased 




commit to the development and execution of a risk management plan as well as a 
disaster recovery and associated incident response plan. 
4.2.5 Policies and Standards - Policy documentation and awareness 
Policies are used to define the rules by which an organization agrees to operate 
and are important in the realm of information security programs. A set of policies 
issued and updated regularly by the organization to ensure that all members 
understand requirements related to information security is a baseline expectation for 
information security programs [37][55][79] to ensure that not only are shared 
interests understood but also to enable compliance with federal and state laws..  
Policies should be accessible [52] and well communicated to organizational members.  
Compliance with policies should be routinely audited. 
All subject matter experts agreed with inclusion of this criterion in the model, 
with the exception of one SME who did not think policy documentation and 
awareness was required.  Four subject matter experts suggested that auditing of 
compliance with policies was also necessary.  This audit interest was included in the 
final definition of the model element. 
4.2.6 Policies and Standards - Procedure documentation and awareness 
Information security procedures are the companion to information security, 
essentially providing the “how” of compliance related to procedures.  A set of 




to ensure compliance with information security policies are needed [38][52][54][55]. 
Procedures should be accessible and well communicated to organizational members 
and compliance with procedures will be routinely audited. 
Subject matter experts agreed with the inclusion of this criterion in the model. 
4.2.7 Policies and Standards - Technical standard documentation and 
awareness 
Technical standards (e.g., hardware standards, configuration standards, patch 
management standards [96][97][253] should be documented and updated regularly 
by the organization to ensure all organization members (as appropriate) understand 
requirements related to information security.  Technical standards should be 
accessible and well communicated.  Compliance with standards will be routinely 
audited. 
Technical standards were not originally defined as a discrete goal within the 
model as they are generally a part of the overall policy and procedure documentation.  
Five subject matter experts provided feedback that their importance was such that 
they should be specifically noted independent of other policies and procedures so the 




4.2.8 Policies and Standards - Sanction documentation and awareness 
Sanctions are defined as a set of repercussions associated with non-
compliance related to information security policies. Non-compliance may be the 
result of a simple mistake, may be intentional and associated with harmful intent, or 
fall somewhere between those ends of the spectrum.  Employees must believe that 
sanctions are appropriate to the behavior and must believe that they will be 
consistently applied across an organization regardless of role in order to have a fully 
functional information security program [38][79][257][258]. Sanction 
documentation should be accessible and well communicated to organizational 
members.  Compliance with sanction guidance should be routinely audited. 
While most subject matter experts believed that sanction documentation was 
important, five experts indicated they were unsure of its importance or that they 
thought it less important than other model elements.  This is not surprising as 
sanction documentation is not always included in existing cybersecurity frameworks; 
however, the literature strongly supports the inclusion of this criteria from a culture 
perspective so the criterion remains part of the overall model. 
4.2.9 Awareness and Training - Communications  
Broad communication about information security is a cornerstone of 
successful information security programs. The creation and internal delivery of 




communication venues are valuable in raising awareness and changing behaviors 
[41][50][65][259]. 
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of communications 
related to information security as part of an effective information security program. 
4.2.10 Awareness and Training - Awareness events 
Awareness events are planned occasions designed to raise awareness of 
information security knowledge throughout an organization and have been 
determined to improve information security programs and the culture related to 
information security [65][79][260]. 
Subject matter experts uniformly agreed to the importance of awareness 
events related to information security as part of an effective information security 
program. 
4.2.11 Awareness and Training - Information portal 
An information portal is defined as an easily accessible internal source that 
provides a knowledge base of security related information [260].  As part of the broad 
information toolkit [259], this could include information both about how to be aware 
of security threats, how to be secure when working from anywhere, and how to report 




information security policies and procedures.  Information portals are common in 
most organization, built out to varying degrees.   
While subject matter experts generally agreed to the importance of an 
information portal in support of a strong information security program, six subject 
matter experts did not believe an information portal was important on first review.  
Upon further investigation it became clear that the experts were considering this 
information portal, in isolation, as if an information portal might be the only way to 
communicate information about training or awareness.  Given this feedback, the 
definition of this goal was re-written to be more explicit about an information portal’s 
importance as part of a broader toolkit of information security training and 
awareness tools. 
4.2.12 Awareness and Training - Training  
Information security training may be delivered either by computer, in-person, 
or both. One-on-one training could be in the form of seminars, departmental 
meetings, or one-on-one sessions.  Some training may be mandatory while other 
training may be optional.  Training, while sometimes discounted by trainees, is a 
powerful tool in creating a culture which supports strong information security 
practices [37][55][63][146][261]. 
Subject matter experts universally agreed that training was appropriate for 




4.2.13 Awareness and Training - Behavioral and real-time teaching  
Behavioral testing and real-time teaching, used appropriately, are effective 
tools in testing work force member's compliance behavior in an attempt to 
demonstrate the common schemes to penetrate information security defenses 
[52][65].  It is important that behavioral  and real-time teaching be conducted in such 
a way that individuals are not embarrassed or shamed if they initially fail these tests 
[37][259].  Rather these events should focus on the learning opportunity and 
improvement over time.  Common tools in this arsenal are related to teaching about 
phishing and USB drive drops (e.g. if you find a USB drive you should not stick it in 
your computer to see what is on it). 
Subject matter experts generally agreed that behavioral testing and real-time 
teaching were appropriate for inclusion in the model. 
4.2.14 Technical Hygiene - Physical controls 
Physical access controls which limit access to technology infrastructure 
(equipment/media) or confidential information are essential. Typical controls 
generally include, but are not limited to, locked barriers, badged access, and security 
cameras.  This information security element can be found not only in predominant 
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253] but also as guidance from the office of the 




While this element was not part of the original model it was included based on 
subject matter expert feedback. 
4.2.15 Technical Hygiene - Asset management 
Under the theory that you can’t protect what you don’t know about, all major 
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], as well as the office of the national 
coordinator for health information technology [5] recommend robust asset 
management systems as part of a comprehensive information security program.  
Asset management systems are defined as technology that supports life cycle 
management related to physical and virtual technology assets. 
While this element was not part of the original model it was included based on 
subject matter expert feedback. 
4.2.16 Technical Hygiene - Routine security updates 
Mature information security programs are characterized by  processes and 
technical tools that facilitate routine security updates for software, endpoints, 
biomedical devices, and other systems.  These security updates are a key element in 
minimizing security vulnerabilities that are often exploited by cybercriminals and are 
often incorporated in existing cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253]. 
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this model 




most appropriate for healthcare organizations and was included in the definition.  If 
this generalizable model was used outside of healthcare the reference to biomedical 
devices should be removed but could be replaced with references to the “internet of 
things” – other devices often out of the span of control of classic information 
technology operations but vulnerable nonetheless. 
4.2.17 Technical Hygiene - Protection of stored information and 
information in transit 
Most modern information security programs include technology (e.g., 
encryption technologies) that ensures data at rest and data in transit are not 
vulnerable to misuse..  All major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253], as well as 
the office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5] 
recommend protection of stored information and information in transit as a key 
criterion in a strong information security program. 
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element 
in the model. 
4.2.18 Technical Hygiene - Identity, authentication, access management 
and monitoring 
Technical tools that ensure only those individuals and systems that need 
access to sensitive data and systems are able to do so.  Identity, authentication, access 




programs as well as major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253],  In addition, they 
are recommended by the office of the national coordinator for health information 
technology [5] as components of strong information security programs. 
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element 
in the model. 
4.2.19 External Threats - Data loss prevention 
Monitoring data as it leaves an organization provides a yellow flag of sorts to 
potential compromise of information security integrity within an organization.  
Technology tools that monitor data as it leaves the organization help ensure 
appropriate levels of security for sensitive information.  Data loss prevention tools 
are components of comprehensive information security programs as well as major 
cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253],  In addition, they are recommended by the 
office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5] as 
components of strong information security programs. 
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element 
in the model. 
4.2.20 External Threats - Anti-spam and malware protection  
In recent years technologies that minimalize incoming spam and mitigate the 




campaigns have flooded both personal and business environments.  These tools are  
consistently components of comprehensive information security programs as well as 
major cybersecurity frameworks [97][99][253].  In addition, they are recommended 
by the office of the national coordinator for health information technology [5] as 
elements of strong information security programs. 
Subject matter experts consistently agreed to the importance of this element 
in the model. 
4.2.21 External Threats - Intrusion detection and prevention 
The most mature information security programs include 24x7 intrusion 
detection and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) programs utilizing 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools.  This information security 
element has received more attention in recent years and is included in both the NIST 
cybersecurity framework [97] as well as the Center for Internet Security framework 
[253]. 
This element was not included in the initial model but was added based on 
feedback from nine subject matter experts.  In one case, an expert noted that if they 
had a managed detection response program in place they would not have been the 
victim of a recent cyberattack which cost the organization both significant financial 




4.2.22 External Threats - Protection of network 
Some of the most fundamental and long standing elements of information 
security relate to protection of an organization’s network. Technical tools that 
minimize threats from outside the network (e.g., network access control, network 
segmentation, firewalls, routine vulnerability scanning) are key elements of an 
effective information security plan.  This element is found in nearly all cybersecurity 
frameworks [97][99][253].   
Subject matter experts consistently agreed on the importance of this element 
in the model and two experts called for a clearer definition that included network 
access control and routine vulnerability scanning.  The definition of this goal was 
modified to reflect this interest which is also supported in the literature. 
In conclusion, each element in the model was evaluated by subject matter 
experts using the Delphi process.  Experts were asked the binary  yes/no question 
related to appropriateness of individual element to be included in the model.  The 
results of those responses all exceeded the 80% or greater agreement threshold 
[234]. 
4.3 Metrics 
Measurement of information security metrics is more art than science, due to 
the complexity of the information security environment and the ever changing 




specificity of measurement [130] and should strive to provide a quantitative and 
objective basis for security assurance [126].  As noted in Chapter 2, information 
security metrics were recognized on the Hard Problem List of the United States 
INFOSEC Research Council in 2005, a situation confirmed by the United States 
National Science and Technology Council in 2011 and further supported as one of the 
five hard problems in Science and Security in 2015 [83]. 
Metrics were established for the output associated with each goal in the model 
and presented to experts for validation.  Following validation, experts were utilized 
to develop desirability curves for each goal level criteria within the model in order to 
quantify the output.  Specific metrics and their associated desirability curves are 
provided in the next section of this document. 
4.4 Desirability Curve Development  
As noted above, expert judgement is used to quantify desirability curves for 
each metric.  Development of desirability curves is a method which converts 
qualitative or quantitative data for a given element in the model to a scaled 
quantitative value.  Using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is the least desirable state and 
100 is the ideal state, a scale with normalized values is developed. The concept is 
clarified by Kocaoglu [232] as a method to utilize expert judgement to create values 




experts identified to aid in the development of desirability curves are decision makers 
as the model will rely on these metrics to define “goodness” of output. 
Metrics and desirability curves relative to each of the twenty-two goals within 
the model are presented below.  Figures 13-34 show their respective desirability 
curves.  Appendix E-1 provides an example of the tool that was shared with experts 
in the development of desirability curves and Appendix E-2 provides the metric 












4.4.1 Desirability Curves Associated with Governance 
Information security governance metrics consist of measures associated with 
established governance structure, defined roles and responsibilities, monitoring and 
measurement of information security performance, and alignment of information 
security strategies with business objectives.  As noted below experts determined the 
ideal state as one that included a comprehensive governance structure which 
includes aligning information security strategies with business objectives.  There is a 
notable increase in desirability from node 2 to 3 in the curve below associated with 
the move from a general structure to defined roles and responsibilities. 
Figure 13:  Desirability Curve for Governance Goal 
 
4.4.2 Desirability Curves Associated with Leadership and Management 
Support 
Information security leadership and management metrics consist of measures 




security, up to and including, modeling of best practices and engaging in alignment of 
business practices associated with information security, as well as routine review of 
information security performance. Experts determined the ideal state as one that 
included all of these characteristics, with a significant increase in desirability between 
nodes 2 to 3 where leaders begin to model information security best practices. 
Figure 14:  Desirability Curve for Leadership and Management Support Goal 
 
 
4.4.3 Desirability Curves Associated with Resource Availability 
Information security resource availability metrics consist of measures 
associated with dedicated information security teams that support tools, training, 
routine assessments, monitoring and consistent improvements in information 
security at an organization. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included 




Figure 15:  Desirability Curve for Resource Availability Goal 
 
4.4.4 Desirability Curves Associated with Risk Assessment, Risk 
Management, Disaster Recovery and Incidence Response 
Information security risk assessment, risk management, disaster recovery and 
incidence response metrics consist of measures associated with documentation and 
practices explicitly named in the title as well as benchmarking against peers. Experts 
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics.  Several 









Figure 16:  Desirability Curve for Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Disaster Recovery and 
Incidence Response Goal 
 
4.4.5 Desirability Curves Associated with Policy Documentation and 
Awareness 
Information security policy documentation and awareness metrics consist of 
measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency of policy 
review and update and understanding by organizational members of relevant 
policies. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these 
characteristics.  Experts noted anecdotally that reaching node 3 was especially 
important in healthcare environments where compliance agencies routinely review 







Figure 17:  Desirability Curve for Policy Documentation and Awareness Goal 
 
4.4.6 Desirability Curves Associated with Procedure Documentation 
and Awareness 
Information security procedure documentation and awareness metrics 
consist of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency 
of procedure review and update and understanding by organizational members of 
relevant procedures. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of 









Figure 18:  Desirability Curve for Procedure Documentation and Awareness Goal 
 
4.4.7 Desirability Curves Associated with Technical Standards 
Documentation and Awareness 
Information security technical standards documentation and awareness 
metrics consist of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, 
frequency of technical standards review and update and understanding by 
organizational members of relevant standards. Experts determined the ideal state as 








Figure 19:  Desirability Curve for Technical Standards Documentation and Awareness Goal 
 
4.4.8 Desirability Curves Associated with Sanction Documentation and 
Awareness 
Information security sanction documentation and awareness metrics consist 
of measures associated with comprehensiveness of documentation, frequency of 
documentation review and update and understanding by organizational members of 
relevant sanctions. Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these 
characteristics, and there is a notable increase in desirability between nodes 2 and 3 








Figure 20:  Desirability Curve for Sanction  Documentation and Awareness Goal 
 
4.4.9 Desirability Curves Associated with Communications 
Information security communication metrics consist of measures associated 
with channels and frequency of communication and ultimately include resources 
dedicated specifically to communication related to information security.  Experts 
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a 
steadily rising curve.   





4.4.10 Desirability Curves Associated with Awareness Events 
Information security awareness events metrics consist of measures associated 
with frequency, attendance and variety of events related to information security.  
Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, 
with a steadily rising curve. 
Figure 22:  Desirability Curve for Awareness Events Goal 
 
4.4.11 Desirability Curves Associated with Information Portal 
Information security portal metrics consist of measures associated with 
existence, content, awareness and usage related to the portal.  Experts determined 
the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase 






Figure 23:  Desirability Curve for Information Portal Goal 
 
4.4.12 Desirability Curves Associated with Training 
Information security training metrics consist of measures associated with 
mode, frequency and diversity of training as well as whether some training is 
required of all institutional members.  Experts determined the ideal state as one that 
included all of these characteristics, with a steadily rising curve.   





4.4.13 Desirability Curves Associated with Behavioral Testing and Real-
time Teaching 
Information security behavioral testing and real-time teaching metrics 
consist of the frequency of testing, the sharing of results related to testing and the 
number of channels used for testing. Experts determined the ideal state as one that 
included all of these characteristics with a steadily rising curve. 
Figure 25:  Desirability Curve for Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching 
 
4.4.14 Desirability Curves Associated with Physical Controls 
Information security physical controls metrics consist of measures associated 
with degree and monitoring of physical access to technology resources. Experts 
determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a 
notable increase in desirability at node 3 where comprehensive physical controls 




Figure 26:  Desirability Curve for Physical Controls Goal 
 
4.4.15 Desirability Curves Associated with Asset Management 
Information security asset management metrics consist of measures 
associated with tools, processes and staffing to support full life cycle management for 
both physical and virtual assets.  Experts determined the ideal state as one that 
included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase in desirability where 
most physical and virtual assets are managed.  





4.4.16 Desirability Curves Associated with Routine Security Updates 
Information security routine security updates metrics consist of measures 
associated with frequency of updates as aligned with defined service levels and 
comprehensiveness of systems updated. Experts determined the ideal state as one 
that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node 3 where 
updates are routine even if they don’t strictly meet service level agreements.  








4.4.17 Desirability Curves Associated with Protection of Stored 
Information and Information in Transit 
Information security metrics for the protection of stored information or 
information in transit consist of measures associated with tools utilized to monitor 
and manage information both on-premise and in cloud-based platforms utilized by 
the organization.  Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these 
characteristics, with a consistent upward curve.  







4.4.18 Desirability Curves Associated with Identity, Authentication, and 
Access Management and Monitoring 
Information security metrics for identity, authentication and access 
management and monitoring consist of the comprehensiveness of the toolset to 
manage both on-premise and cloud-based systems. Experts determined the ideal 
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a steadily rising curve.  










4.4.19 Desirability Curves Associated with Data Loss Prevention 
Information security metrics for data loss protection consist of measures 
associated with tools utilized to monitor and manage data loss both on-premise and 
in cloud-based platforms utilized by the organization.  Experts determined the ideal 
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node 
3 where a comprehensive toolset for on-premise solutions is available. 
Figure 31:  Desirability Curve for Data Loss Prevention Goal 
 
4.4.20 Desirability Curves Associated with Anti-spam and Malware 
Protection 
Information security metrics for anti-spam and malware protection consist of 
measures related to capabilities of the tools utilized to manage both on-premise and 
cloud-based platforms utilized by the organization.  Experts determined the ideal 
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase at node 




platforms. This is unsurprising given the specific threat posed by phishers in the 
current information security threat landscape. 
Figure 32:  Desirability Curve for Anti-spam and Malware Protection Goal 
 
4.4.21 Desirability Curves Associated with Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention 
Information security metrics for intrusion detection and prevention consist of 
measures associated with both tools and staffing, including support around the clock.  
Experts determined the ideal state as one that included all of these characteristics, 
with a notable increase in desirability at node 3 where the toolset is richer although 








Figure 33:  Desirability Curve for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Goal 
 
4.4.22 Desirability Curves Associated with Protection of Network 
Information security metrics for protection of network consist of measures 
associated with both tools and staffing for monitoring.  Experts determined the ideal 
state as one that included all of these characteristics, with a notable increase in 
desirability at node 3 where the toolset is more diverse although systems may not be 
routinely monitored.  





CHAPTER 5: FINALIZING THE MODEL 
The following section discusses the finalization of the generalizable maturity 
model, beginning with expert validation of the model content and construct, followed 
by expert quantification of the decision criteria importance and finally establishing 
weights for model elements.   The use of experts in the field of information security, 
both from a variety of roles as well as diversity of organization type, was a critical 
component of the development and validation of the model.  
 
5.1 Model Validation 
It is important to select outputs that reflect the desired mission outcome of the 
model.  Objectives, goals and outputs were originally defined based on literature and 
were then validated and quantified by industry experts.  Elements of the model were 
validated by binary acceptance data (yes/no) and were included in the model at the 
80% agreement level [234].  Appendix C shows how 5 objectives (Appendix C-1),  
twenty-two goals (Appendix C-2), and associated output elements (Appendix C-3) 
were validated and accepted. The validation of objectives and goals required an 
iterative process.  The initial validation step included 50 expert opinions and the 
secondary validation step included six experts. 
Figure 35 shows how the validated elements were joined to develop a 




2, twenty-two goals fill level 3, level 4 output details are provided in Appendix C-3 
and each goal has an associated desirability curve to complete the model. 
Figure 35:  Validated HDM 
 
5.2 Quantification of model 
The pairwise comparison technique was used for the quantification process 
for each decision element.  Judgment quantification instruments (Appendix A-4) were 
designed and administered to each panel of experts to collect pairwise comparison 
information. HDM © 2.0 software was used to collect pairwise comparison data.  Raw 
data tables are available in Appendix D. HDM software was also used to complete 
inconsistency and disagreement measures. 
5.3 Inconsistency 
This research utilized the average standard deviation method to measure 




the tolerance threshold of 10% were further examined under the lens of research 
conducted by Abbas [235], who found that the 10% threshold limit was increasingly 
conservative as the number of decision elements increase from the range of three 
elements to twelve elements. 
Two experts demonstrated a moderate  inconsistency measurement when 
providing pairwise comparison judgments at the objective level of the model. Figure 
36 shows that expert 8 has an inconsistency value of 0.11, and expert 24 is at the 
threshold of .10.  





The decision variables in this case include the five different objective 
elements:  organizational support, policies and standards, awareness and training, 
technical hygiene and mitigation of external threats.  Abbas found the 10% threshold 
to be quite conservative when experts were asked to make comparative judgment 
involving 5 elements [235].  Therefore, the data for experts 8 and 24 were accepted 
into the study as they were either at or near the .10 threshold. 
5.4 Disagreement Analysis 
While experts may disagree for many reasons as noted in Chapter 3.  
Disagreement levels were below  the 0.10 threshold [195][225] using the HDM 2.0© 
software; therefore no further action was taken.   If disagreement had been found 
experts may have been asked to repeat judgement in order to ascertain whether 
disagreement might decrease to acceptable levels.    
5.5 Finalized HDM 
Figure 37 shows the finalized validated model with decision element weights 








Figure 37:  Generalizable model for healthcare information security maturity  
 
It is no surprise that the two technically focused objectives, information 
security hygiene and mitigation of external threats given the generally technical 
nature of the of the topic and the proliferation of tools to aid in the projection of 
information.  These results reinforce the technical focus of existing information 
security models.  This model does however provide a different perspective on the 
importance of training and organization support elements, which are rarely 
quantified in other information security frameworks.  Further discussion is presented 







CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDIES 
Case studies were conducted to illustrate how the model works and to validate 
model elements as to the degree which the model reflects actual performance. Data 
were acquired from five healthcare organizations by means of a data collection 
instrument to populate the metrics, identifying those outputs for each organization 
and aligning with the respective desirability values to create a score for each case 
study site.  Analysis of results were presented to experts for feedback.  This chapter 
is organized in four sections: 
Section 1 Broad description of five healthcare organization types included in case 
studies and a brief introduction of each case study site with specific identification 
information removed to protect confidentiality of the participant site; 
Section 2 Illustration of  how data was collected and used to calculate a maturity 
model score for a single case study site; 
Section 3 Review of performance evaluation for all case study sites including 
strengths and suggested areas for improvement; 
Section 4 Discussion of sensitivity analysis of model, assessing the impact of changes 




6.1 Healthcare organization selection 
Healthcare organization come in many different sizes and shapes.  In order to 
test the model for generalizability a variety of different organization types and sizes 
were selected for case study inclusion.  The following organization types were 
included in the case studies: 
• Critical Access Hospital – Critical Access Hospital is a designation given 
to eligible rural hospitals by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS).  The designation is designed to increase access to 
healthcare for rural communities and reduce the financial vulnerability 
of these sites.  Critical Access Hospitals have 25 or fewer acute care 
inpatient beds, are located 35 miles from another hospital, and provide 
24/7 emergency care services.   
• Stand-alone Community Hospital - Stand-alone community hospitals 
are generally the sole or predominant healthcare provider in the 
market they serve.  They are independent and are not aligned to any 
larger health system. These community hospitals are generally closely 
aligned with local physician groups.   
• Integrated Delivery Network (IDN) – An integrated delivery network is 
a system of healthcare facilities and providers that offer both 
healthcare services as well as healthcare insurance plans to a defined 




geographic area.  They vary greatly in size (number of facilities, 
providers, patients served). 
• Large Healthcare System – A healthcare system is a collection of 
facilities and providers, who may or may not be employed by the 
healthcare facility, who work together to deliver a variety of healthcare 
services.   Unlike the IDN noted above the healthcare system does not 
explicitly offer healthcare care insurance plans. In this case, large is 
defined as greater than one hospital and over 500 inpatient beds. 
• Academic Medical Center – Academic medical centers are universities 
that teach medical students and include one or more hospitals as well 
as  provider practice plans to provide hands-on experience to their 
students as well as graduate medical education training.  Academic 
medical centers provide a wide range of healthcare services for 
patients and often include cutting edge research capabilities. 
The Chief Information Officer was contacted at each potential case study site 
to ascertain their interest and ability to participate in the study.  These decision 
makers and experts were able to respond to the data collection instrument and in one 
case asked if they could include other information security experts within their 
organization in the process to ensure accuracy of response.  Those additional experts 
were happily included.  Table 7 provides a summary of  key demographics [262] 




Table 7:  Summary of Key Demographics for Case Study Sites 
 
A more specific description of each case study site is provided below, although 
the information is anonymized to protect that site’s confidentiality. 
6.1.1 Critical Access Hospital (CAH) 
The case study site has been rated one of the top 100 Critical Access Hospitals 
in the nation by the Chartis Group many times in the past decade.  Serving their rural 
community for over 100 years, they are committing to ensuring those they support  
thrive. 
6.1.2 Stand-alone community hospital 
The case study site is a community owned, non-profit community hospital.  It 
is characterized as a social and economic asset focused on serving its local 
community.   Serving more than 80,000 individuals, it is the only hospital in a 10,000 
square mile area and serves as a teaching hospital. 
6.1.3 Integrated Delivery Network (IDN)  
The case study site is a not-for-profit network of five hospitals, numerous 




community.  It is characterized as a social and economic asset, as one of the 
community’s largest employers and is focused on serving local communities. 
6.1.4 Large health system 
The case study site is a locally owned not-for-profit network of seven hospitals 
and numerous clinics serving both urban and rural communities. It is characterized 
by a high level of specialty care services, including a level 1 trauma center.  It serves 
as a key social and economic asset to the community as one of the largest employers 
in the region. 
6.1.5 Academic medical center 
The case study site is a public non-profit serving all citizens of the state. It is 
characterized not only for teaching the next generation of healthcare professionals 
but also a site providing access to state-of-the-art healthcare including clinical trials. 
As the largest employer in their city, they are a key economic engine for not only the 
city but also the state through their tri-part mission of teaching, healing and 
discovery.   
6.2 Illustration case: Stand-alone community hospital (SACH) 
The stand-alone community based hospital case study is used to illustrate how 
the data were collected and the metrics were populated to create a score for the 
health information security maturity model.  The SACH was selected as the case study 




support for information security.  They are vulnerable to cybercriminals as a result of 
historic lack of investment in information security by healthcare organizations and 
are in need of a tool that can help them prioritize their scarce resources.   
The data collection approach utilized an instrument that was designed and 
administered by the researcher by way of an interview with the Chief Information 
Officer at the case study site.  The data collection instrument is available in Appendix  
F-1. 
6.2.1 Maturity assessment score 















Table 8: Maturity Assessment Score for Stand-alone Community Hospital  
 
6.2.1 Strengths and Opportunities for Improvement  
The assessment provides a concise view of the strengths and opportunities for 
improvement at the stand-alone community hospital. These strengths and opportunities are 
presented in Table 9 below where strengths are highlighted in green, where score value as 
a percent of optimal value is 75 or higher, and opportunities are highlighted in yellow where 








Table 9: Strengths and Opportunities  for Stand-alone Community Hospital 
 
 The table highlights how the model was able to capture discrete attributes that 
contribute to, or detract from ,overall information security maturity.  In addition, it is 
clear how much those element matter in the overall maturity score.   
 In this case study, the stand-alone community hospital scores well in resource 
availability, sanctions documentation and awareness, training, physical controls, 
routine security updates, and anti-spam and malware protection.  Of note, resource 
availability with an optimal value of .24, training with an optimal value of .24, routine 
security updates with an optimal value of .23, and anti-spam and malware protection 
with an optimal value of .25 are high value elements within the model and ultimately 




elements.  This value is increased further as the objective level values for technical 
hygiene, associated with physical controls and routine security updates, has an 
optimal value of  .24.  The same is true for the optimal level value for mitigation of 
external threats, associated with anti-spam and malware protection, at .24.   
Moving to opportunities for improvement, it is shown that the stand-alone 
community hospital does not score as well in risk assessment, risk management, 
disaster recovery and incident response with an optimal value of .29, procedure 
documentation and awareness, with an optimal value of .24, technical standards 
documentation and awareness with an optimal value of .34, information portal with 
an optimal value of .10, asset management with an optimal value of .18 and intrusion 
detection and prevention, with an optimal value of .29.  This is less concerning as it 
relates to procedure documentation and awareness and technical standards 
documentation and awareness since the associated policies and standards objective 
level optimal value is .14, and therefore of less overall impact to the  total score.  The 
same is true with a low score associated with information portal given the relatively 
low optimal value of .10 with and associated  optimal goal value of .19 for awareness 
and training.  Making improvements to intrusion detection and prevention, with an 
optimal value of .29 and an optimal objective value of .24 for mitigation of external 
threats, asset management, with an optimal value of .18 and an optimal objective 
value of .24 for technology hygiene, and risk assessment, risk management, disaster 




optimal objective level value of .19 for organizational support would be good areas of 
focus to improve the overall maturity score. 
These findings were presented to the local expert.  The expert agreed with the 
recommendations and further indicated that enhancing intrusion detection and 
prevention was a current high priority program of work at the case study site in order 
to improve their information security environment.  The expert further disclosed that 
the case study organization had been a recent victim of a cyberattack and that lack of 
an established intrusion detection and prevention program was a significant factor in 
the damaging impact of the event on the organization. 
6.3 Comparative Analysis Across All Case Study Sites 
As noted earlier a total of five case study maturity model scores were 
performed.  Comparing information security performance across organizations is 
fairly rare given the high stakes associated with acknowledging information security 
vulnerabilities.  It is well known that what we measure matters, and where we 
measure we have the opportunity to improve.  Measurement helps us not only 
identify opportunities for improvement but also permits organizations that routinely 
participate in benchmarking with peers to better understand how they are doing 




A side-by-side comparison of maturity model scores, with details associated 
with each element of the HDM is available in Appendix F-2.  A summary of the health 
information security maturity model scores is provided below in Table 10. 
Table 10: Maturity Scores for Case Study Sites 
 
It is evident from the case study maturity scores that there is great variety in 
the maturity of health information security across organizations. Investment in 
information security varies greatly across organizations, and it is unsurprising that 
the organization that is least likely to have access to critical resources to support a 
robust information security environment (Critical Access Hospital) has a lower 
maturity rating than organizations that generally have greater access to resources 
(Integrated Delivery Network).    The scores are not intended to represent “good” or 
“bad” or “winners” or “losers”.  Rather they should be used to identify opportunities 
of focus for utilization of scarce resources. 
A closer look at the greatest strengths and most telling weaknesses of each 






Table 11: Key Maturity Scores for Case Study Sites 
 
The variety shown above may be caused by several factors.  Cost of some 
solutions may be higher than others. Some solutions will be easier to implement than 
others. Lack of frameworks which measure  the importance of the factors related to 
creating a mature information security environment may have led to a less focused 
approach on which measures provide the greatest value.  In any case, these baseline 
scores provide a framework to measure performance in a quantified way going 




information model should not serve as a laundry list of things to do, but instead as a 
tool that can be used for further analysis to prioritize high value work that could 
contribute to improving overall maturity in information security.  Further analysis of 
the scores at each case study site allows for specific recommendation for each site.  
Sharing scores with peers, if conducted in a confidential manner, could provide an 
opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned.  During the case study 
process one site suggested the model could be used by a group of regional peers at 
one of their periodic meetings to facilitate a discussion of this kind. 
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Many decisions change over time as they are dependent on a given point in 
time and current conditions. This is certainly true in the constantly evolving 
information security landscape.  As a result, the model’s validity and quality could 
change in response to environment factors.  In recent years the technical perspectives 
of information security have changed as threats shifted from lone cyber mischief 
makers to complicated and extremely skilled networks of cybercriminals.  The 
technologies that are used to wage cyberthreat response have changed considerably 
in cost and capability as well.  Organizational support too has received increasing 
attention as nefarious cyber activity causes significant financial and reputational 
harm, gaining the attention of organizational Boards of Directors.  All these and other 





There are different methods that can be used to conduct sensitivity analysis.  
In this case, scenario analysis is used where a change in relative importance at the 
objective level of the model is tested.  This type of analysis helps decision makers 
understand how much the model depends on input factors [263].  In the field of 
technology management, due to the generally dynamic nature of change within the 
field, scenario analysis has been used to determine the potential impact of a change 
of importance of objectives as a way to ensure the robustness of the model and 
associated results [195][241]. 
Looking again at the stand-alone community hospital case study, the 
calculated maturity score was used as a baseline and then five extreme scenarios 
were applied to the model.  In each of the five extreme scenarios, a maximum weight 
was given to each respective objective level element and then the case study’s 
maturity level is recalculated based on the new weight structure within the model.  In 
other words, one objective is given a weight of 96% and each of the other objectives 
in the model are given a weight of 1%.  Table 12 below provides a visual 







Table 12: Reallocated Model Weights for Scenario Analysis 
 
 In the case of the stand-alone community hospital, the overall maturity score 
is significantly harmed when increased emphasis is placed on the policies and 
standards objective.  This makes sense, as the organization’s performance at the 
metric level within that objective in quite poor.  Their overall maturity score increases 
materially under the scenario where mitigation of external threats is emphasized.  A 
summary of the SACH’s maturity scores under each scenario is provided in Table 13 





















CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, the results of the model development as related to the problem 
statement are discussed as well as practical implications of findings. In addition, the 
generalizability of the model is analyzed.  Expert feedback responses during the 
model validation process support concerns identified in literature regarding severity 
of threat and need for prioritization of cybersecurity strategies given limited 
resources.  Subject matter experts were in agreement of the validity of model. 
As noted in the problem statement, an easy to use, generalizable model, that 
provides a holistic set of metrics with performance scores for information security 
maturity is much needed.  This tool must identify the common criteria that impact the 
maturity of healthcare organization’s information security environments, directly 
impacting their ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
systems they rely upon to continue business operations.    The directional information 
provided by such a model could be used to facilitate decisions about where healthcare 
organizations can best utilize their finite resources.  In addition the tools will help 
organizations measure their maturity, and associated effectiveness, over time.   
As part of the gap analysis, research gaps 1 and 2 specifically, it was discussed 
that the criteria for assessing information security in healthcare organizations is not 
organized in a way that identifies the most important risk mitigation actions, nor is 




information security in healthcare organizations that produces a score.  Discussion 
with experts from each of the validation and quantification panels confirmed these 
findings.   
7.1 Research and Practical Implications 
The research validated the decision criteria and relative linkages for each 
criterion consistent with information gleaned from the literature review. One of the 
interesting findings is that while the research shows the importance of all criteria in 
the model, it specifically identifies the criteria that hold a greater level of importance, 
through a higher ranked weighted value.  The results also confirm that technology 
solutions alone are not enough to create a mature information security environment.   
In the remainder of this section, each of the top five weighted criteria will be 
reviewed.  Interestingly, one of the criteria within those noted as top five was 
introduced to the model as a result of the expert validation and quantification 
process.  This highlights the importance of expert feedback during the model  
development process.  Finally, it is worth noting that the model elements were fine-
tuned during the validation and quantification process, new elements were added to 
the model and clarification was provided to the definition for many elements.  Table 
14 provides a visual representation of all model criteria by weight, calling out the top 
5, the bottom 5 and those criteria that were added to the model as a result of expert 




Table 14: Model Elements by Weight  
 
7.1.1 Top Rated Criteria – Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
The most important element of the model based on expert panel quantification 
is intrusion detection and prevention, and is defined as a “24x7 intrusion detection 
and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) program utilizing Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) tools” based on both literature review as 
well as expert feedback.  As noted earlier, this specific element was added to the 




highly as external cyber threats have grown in frequency and negative impact.  The 
importance of proactive cyberthreat intelligence is noted by Khan et al. [264] in their 
proposal for augmented threat intelligence. 
7.1.2 Top Rated Criteria – Protection of Network 
The second highest rated element of the model based on expert panel 
quantification is protection of network, and is defined as “technical tools that 
minimize threats from outside the network (e.g. network access control, network 
segmentation, firewalls, routine vulnerability scanning)” based on both literature 
review as well as expert feedback. As with intrusion detection and prevention, 
protection of network is focused on limiting access to an organization’s network and 
further securing known vulnerabilities within the network. The importance of 
network protection was highlighted in Wang’s [265] work promoting artificial 
intelligence solutions in this space. The high rating received by this element is also 
likely related to the recent increase in frequency and negative impact of external 
actors.  
7.1.3 Top Rated Criteria – Identity, Authentication, and Access 
Management and Monitoring 
Third on the list of highest ranking elements of the model based on expert 
panel quantification is identity, authentication, and access management and 




sensitive data and systems are able to do so,” based on both literature review as well 
as expert feedback. As with intrusion detection and prevention and protection of 
network, identity, authentication and access management and monitoring  is focused 
on limitation of access to organizational information systems. Unlike the two highest 
rated criteria, this element provides for segregation of access at the individual system 
level in addition to minimizing access to the organization at the global level.  In this 
way, access to sensitive data such as protected health information (PHI) is further 
limited. While interest in limiting access at the system level is not unique to 
healthcare organizations it is especially important at healthcare organizations due to 
the increased risk associated with those particular data types, thus the importance of 
this criteria as rated by experts is understandable.   The importance of identity 
management as part of a larger cybersecurity strategy is noted in the work of Khan et 
al. [266] as they explored novel solutions to this vexing challenge through use of 
blockchain technologies. 
7.1.4 Top Rated Criteria – Anti-spam and Malware Protection 
Rated fourth on the list of highest ranking elements of the model based on 
expert panel quantification is anti-spam and malware protection, defined as 
“technology that minimalize incoming spam and mitigates threat of malware 
infection,” based on both literature review as well as expert feedback.  Anti-spam and 
malware protection has become increasingly important as a result of both the 




quarantine known malicious incoming email, preventing organizational end users 
from ever being exposed to those threats.  One expert reported that “97% of all email 
coming into their organization was captured by their anti-spam tool”, meaning only 
3% of all incoming email was valid and delivered to end users.  Even so, some 
malicious email gets through and malware protection software fills this gap.  The 
combination of tools serves as a strong barrier between bad actors and organizational 
end users.  Anti-spam and malware tools retain important positions in the maturity 
of information security environments [267].  In addition these tools are generally 
more mature and less costly than some tools associated with information security 
which may serve as another reason why this element ranked highly in importance 
within the model. 
7.1.5 Top Rated Criteria – Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching 
The fifth highest rated element of the model based on expert panel 
quantification is behavioral testing and real-time teaching, and is defined as “active 
attempts to test work force member's compliance behavior (e.g. phishing education 
tools and USB drive drops)” based on both literature review as well as expert 
feedback. The literature identified organization members as a significant threat to 
information security within organizations.  Tools and processes that facilitate active 
learning for organizational members about common threat vectors such as phishing, 
when used consistently, have been shown to greatly influence organizational member 




interactive experience that is well suited to a larger strategy associated with training 
and awareness.  Utilization of behavioral testing tools has increased dramatically in 
healthcare organizations in recent years as the benefit of these tools has been seen to 
provide quantitative positive change in user response to phishing.   Anti-phishing 
tools are generally inexpensive relative to other information security investments so 
they provide a high value proposition to healthcare organizations.  Skula et al. [268] 
note the importance of interactive education as a mitigation to the human threat of 
phishing in information security.  This high value proposition is likely a key 
contributor to the high ranking received by this element within the model.  
7.2 Generalizability 
Expert feedback validated the generalizable model as a valid and reasonable 
approach to aid decision makers in evaluation of priority setting for information 
security resources allocation.  As noted earlier, a group of experts with diverse 
experience coming from a variety of healthcare organization types contributed to the 
model development, validation and quantification, specifically: 
• Experts were either chief information officers,  chief privacy officers or 
chief information security officers.  Each of these roles provides a 
unique perspective to information security maturity and relative 




• Experts represented a broad variety of healthcare organization types, 
not only large and small but diverse in terms of the communities they 
serve (e.g. urban, rural).  These diverse organizations also provide a 
variety of services to their communities, some providing health 
insurance plans, others providing specialty clinical services, still others 
providing access to clinical trials.  Even home-based healthcare care 
services are provided by some. 
• The use of experts in development of desirability curves allows for the 
model to be reused without the need for secondary review by subject 
matter experts at the conclusion of each assessment. 
• During conversations with experts many indicated that this model may 
be used by any type of healthcare organization.  One expert asked the 
researcher to facilitate the utilization of the model to develop maturity 
scores within a peer-based healthcare organization forum, in order for 
those participating organizations to share maturity models scores with 
one another in an effort to share best practices.  Still another expert 
suggested the model could easily be used by those outside of 
healthcare, specifically in academic settings, as the basic premise of 
information security remains fairly constant across industries. 
It is important to note that while the model has been validated and is reusable, 




7.3 Feedback from Experts and Other Considerations 
Feedback from experts related to the conduct of this study was uniformly 
positive.  In many cases experts expressed the sentiment “this is much needed” and 
“extremely important for healthcare organizations”, one expert went so far as to say 
“I think you have nailed this!”  As noted earlier, more than one expert suggested that 
facilitation of the assessment in small peer-based group settings was desirable and 
could result in productive peer-based conversations that could not only improve 
information security maturity at a specific organization, but also develop a 
community of interest, encouraging information sharing which would promote long 
term improvement in information security for the greater group. 
The experts were derived from diverse healthcare organizations – academic 
medical centers, community hospitals, critical access hospitals, integrated delivery 
networks, and large hospital systems.  In addition, they contributed diverse 
perspectives to model development as chief information officers, chief privacy 
officers and chief information security officers.  While the model was validated and 
quantified specifically by experts with healthcare information security knowledge,  
experts specifically noted that the model might be generalizable to other industry 
sectors as most information security threats are consistent across sectors.  
 This research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2020 




organizations in the United States as well as elevated cyber risk  as illustrated by the 
joint announcement issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Department of Health and Human Services [269] in the Fall of 2020.  Healthcare 
organizations were transitioning those employees who could work from home to do 
so, taking their work computers with them or using personal devices to access 
healthcare organizations’ networks.  They were also rapidly deploying digital 
healthcare  capabilities in order to meet critical community healthcare needs at a 
time when many patients could not physically come to traditional healthcare 
locations.  In addition, many healthcare organizations were setting up large scale 
clinical operations for the delivery of vaccines in non-traditional locations (e.g. 
stadium and airport parking lots).  These major shifts in technology delivery and 
utilization, created at speed by technology professionals, also produced new and 
non-traditional risks for healthcare organizations [270]. 
Healthcare organizations onboarded many new staff to meet the increased 
demand for healthcare services.  These new employees or contractors were likely 
unfamiliar with the information security culture within the healthcare organizations 
they were joining.  Many may have been unfamiliar with the concept of information 
security at all and needed to be trained.  Finally, as the pandemic persisted 
healthcare workers became increasingly stressed and exhausted, This exhaustion 
and stress could quite easily lead to lack of attention on required information 




The culmination of new technology, new employees and increased fatigue on 
existing employees certainly has the potential to threaten the information security 
maturity within healthcare organizations specifically.  Jalali et al. [271] confirm a 
need for healthcare delivery organizations to ensure the safety of patient 
information especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. This rapidly changing 
environment combined with an increased cyber threat may have influenced the 
engagement of experts in the development of the model.  For some experts, it 
provided an opportunity for them to be a part of helping create solutions for the 
healthcare community at large.  For other experts it created an impediment in their 
ability to participate as their attention was keenly focused on solving specific 
problems at their home institutions and they did not have time to participate in this 
research.  It is also possible that the environment for information security in 
healthcare during the pandemic influenced not only what elements of the 
information security maturity model were included in the model but also the 
importance of certain criterion.  This dynamic created an environment of very 
engaged experts who provided feedback at a time which may have been pivotable in 







CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter will focus on addressing the research goal, gaps and questions 
and discuss contributions to research and the practice of health information security.  
In addition, the limitations of the research as well as future research opportunities 
will be reviewed.  
8.1 Conclusions and Contributions 
The objective of this research is to develop a framework for assessing 
information security maturity within healthcare organizations in the United States.  
Initiation of this research began with a comprehensive literature review of the 
information security environment for healthcare organizations followed by a further 
investigation of cyber security frameworks and metrics.  As a result of this work, an 
initial hierarchical decision model was created which consisted of elements which 
have an impact on information security maturity within healthcare organizations.  
This fundamental model was then validated, finalized, and quantified by information 
security experts in the healthcare field.  Desirability curves were created through the 
help of experts to extend the model.  Five case studies were then conducted to 
evaluate the model’s performance against expected outcomes and to confirm the 
generalizability of the model.  Finally the model was tested by scenario analysis to 





By creating a maturity model for information security in healthcare 
environments, this research contributes to the existing body of knowledge on 
technology management maturity assessments in the healthcare industry, as well as 
maturity models in support of information security.  Specifically, as noted in the 
literature review, more information is needed on the ways that healthcare 
organizations measure, monitor, and optimize their information security 
environments.  The literature review further noted a lack of structured, 
comprehensive and usable assessment tools for healthcare organizations in 
measuring their performance so they could prioritize scarce resources and share best 
practices related to information security among peers.  This research provides a 
multi-criteria tool which has been quantified and validated for repeat use in multiple 
healthcare organization types which produces a score.  The maturity model may also 
provide insight into the importance of the human element of information security. 
The model supports improved decision making at the institutional level by 
helping organizations better under the maturity of their information security 
environments.  This model is a cost effective solution which is easy to administer, 
minimizing the need for third-part resources or extensive human resources to 
maintain.  The healthcare information security maturity model will help 
organizations make better decisions about where to apply their scarce resources in 
order to improve their information security environments.  This model may be 




of effort required to complete an institutional assessment.   Using the model 
healthcare organizations will be able to deploy information security programs that 
will improve the integrity of data as well as the reliability of information systems, 
thereby improving their information security compliance and minimizing the risk of 
both internal and external threats.  The potential to improve information security 
within the healthcare industry is vast and a successful maturity model will not only 
improve information security environments, potentially savings hundreds of millions 
of dollars, it might also literally save lives. 
The model may also be used to share best practices across healthcare 
organizations regardless of the type of organization.  There has been growing interest 
in the healthcare community to share, confidentially with peers, some level of 
information about the information security environments within respective 
organizations.  A major provider of electronic records began the conduct of a 
confidential information security benchmark activity in 2018 which allows some 
healthcare information to learn more about the tools and staffing levels of their peers 
in a way that masks the individual organizations contributing to the survey.  This 
exercise did not produce a score of any kind, but it illustrates a willingness on the part 
of healthcare organizations to share more about their information security in a 
trusted environment.  As the cybersecurity threat has increased, many organizations 
are more willing, and even eager, to share best practices and lessons learned in 




of a number of communities of interest both inside and outside of healthcare, 
nationally and regionally.  These communities build upon the trusted relationships of 
information technology professionals, and sometimes include partnership with 
federal agencies.  It is evident that where cybersecurity used to be a cloak-and-dagger 
exercise, it has become a team sport as organizations learn that they are better 
prepared to fight the cybersecurity battle informed by the knowledge and experience 
of a broader community. 
Table 15 shows how this research has addressed the gaps identified in the 
literature review. 







Table 16 shows how the research has addressed the research questions posed 
earlier in this dissertation. 
Table 16: Addressing Research Questions 
 
In summary, the research offers contribution to both the research body of 
knowledge as well as provides practical tools for healthcare organizations in 
evaluating and improving their information security maturity. 
8.2 Risks and Limitations 
Most research comes with limitations and potential risks.  This research is no 
exception to that principle. 
The first limitation of this research is associated with the use of expert panels.  
While a broad variety of experts were utilized in the conduct of this research, experts 
are subject to the same human biases we all have.    They may be inconsistent or 
disagreement may be found among experts.  In order to protect against this specific 




addition some of the data was collected through verbal interaction to minimize 
confusion related to complexity of some research concepts. 
The second limitation of this research is that the model was validated and 
quantified solely by healthcare experts.  While it was found to be generalizable across 
healthcare organizations it may not be viable as a model to support information 
security maturity in other organization types (e.g. entertain companies). 
The HDM model methodology itself is vulnerable to limitations when there is 
a difference of more than one criterion under different goals.  As the number of 
criteria within a given goal becomes larger the relative value of those particular 
criteria may be diminished in value in the overall construct of the model.    For 
example, say one objective with a model value of .20 had three  supporting goals and 
another objective, which also had a model value of .20, but had five supporting goals.  
The goals associated at the objective level would still only contribute to a combined 
.20 value in the model.  This could lead to the development of a model which does not 
accurately reflect the true individual criterion values.  In order to mitigate this risk 
the health information security maturity model had either four or five criteria 
associated with each objective within the model for a gap of no more than one 




8.3 Future Research 
A primary output of this research is the creation of a generalizable information 
security maturity model for healthcare organizations.  While created solely with 
healthcare experts, many foundational elements related to information security are 
not necessarily industry specific.  The model may be more broadly generalizable to a 
variety of industries.  Exploration of this opportunity could lead to either creation of 
new maturity models that are industry specific or it could determine that the existing 
model is more broadly generalizable than tested during the current research study.  
If this line of research were pursued, further study could compare the resulting 
models and analyzing similarities or differences. 
The healthcare industry is subject to change, sometimes rapid change.  If 
threat vectors significantly change, or the overall landscape of information security 
changes it could impact the validity of the model.  Routine updates of the model are 
likely necessary and may yield new findings which contribute to the overall body of 
knowledge associated with healthcare information security. 
The model is ultimately designed to help organizations prioritize their 
resources in order to improve their maturity scores and resulting information 
security environment.  Studies of individual sites or a larger group of sites over time, 
say over a three year period utilizing an unchanged model, would be of value to 




scores.  In addition, the maturity score over time might be studied along with other 
measures such as number of breaches or number of security incidents to determine 
if a change in score impacts breach or incident activity levels.  If the model were 
utilized by enough healthcare organizations of varying types and sizes, trends might 
be identified by organization type or size.  In order to facilitate this outcome, process 
documentation would have to be created to guide research assistants to conduct the 
questionnaire activity and a centralized repository for scoring data would need to be 
created and maintained.  Finally, a study comparing outcomes for those organizations 
that use the information security maturity model and those that don’t, as measured 
by information security breach or incident level, could be conducted. 
While not deeply explored in this study, there may be value in extending the 
model to include categories of performance as are found in the HIMSS Analytics 
Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model [113] and discussed in Chapter 2.  The 
value of this extension would be the creation of descriptors of maturity levels, as 
opposed to just a numerical score.  There might also be interest in creating a 
certification process associated with reaching certain performance categories. 
As mentioned previously, at least one expert requested assistance with 
assessment of the health information security maturity model to a larger peer-based 
group of healthcare organizations.  For example, a single day in-person seminar could 




questionnaire, analysis of individual sites as well as a group analysis, review of 
findings and then an interactive guided discussion. If structured properly, this 
exercise could mitigate concerns related to expert self-assessment at the individual 
site level.  Conduct of this activity, in a structured way, either as a single event or over 
time, may produce new learnings and contributions both to the literature as well as 
to operational improvements.   
There is potential to use the model as a foundation for the development of an 
education roadmap for cyber security professionals either within healthcare or 
outside of healthcare, if the model is found to be more broadly generalizable than 
demonstrated by the current research.  The need for information security specialists 
is high and current educational programs largely focus on technology solutions alone.  
This research has demonstrated that technology solutions alone are not enough to 
create mature information security environments.  A comprehensive educational 
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Appendix A: Research Instruments 
Appendix A-1: Invitation Letter 
Good Morning, 
  
I am writing to request your assistance.  I am a PhD student in Engineering and Technology 
Management Department (ETM) at Portland State University (PSU). I am also a peer as Chief 
Information Officer at Oregon Health & Science University. 
  
I am conducting my dissertation research entitled “Healthcare Information 
Security Maturity Model”. As part of my research, I am forming expert panels to help me 
validate and quantify my research model. I have identified you as an expert in the field. Your 
knowledge, background, experience, and expertise will be very helpful for my research.   
  
If you agree to participate in this research, a consent form will be sent to you for signature. After 
I receive the signed form, I will send you web-based data collection instruments for you to 
provide your response. You will be asked to participate in 1-3 surveys.  The surveys vary in 
length taking from 3 to 15 minutes each.  All questions are multiple choice or ranking of items, 
no open-ended questions. To access the survey, you will be asked for an email address. This will 
be to assure no one takes the assessment twice and it is also where a free copy of your survey 
results will be emailed. You do not have to use your work or business email address. Your 
information will only be utilized for this research and will never be seen, sold, given to, or 
utilized outside this research (so no spam or unsolicited emails). No personally identifiable 
information will be utilized and your answers to the survey will be combined with every other 
participant.  
  
Thank you in advance for considering my request for assistance. If you have any questions or 
concerns, please feel free to contact me at any time, my contact information is listed below. 
  
Bridget Barnes Page  
PhD Student  
Engineering and Technology Management Department (ETM) Portland State University (PSU)  
Chief Information Officer 
Oregon Health & Science University 
Phone: 503-702-7866  
Email:    pagebridget@outlook.com  





Appendix A-2: Consent Form  
Consent to Participate in Research 
Project Title:   Healthcare Information Security Maturity Model  
Researcher:   Bridget Barnes Page   
Department of Engineering Management   
Portland State University   
Researcher Contact:  pagebridget@outlook.com or barnesbr@ohsu.edu   
(503) 702-7866   
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The box below highlights key information 
about this research for you to consider when making a decision whether or not to participate. 
Carefully review the information provided on this form. Please ask questions about any of the 
information you do not understand before you decide to participate.   
Key Information for You to Consider  
• Voluntary Consent. You are being asked to volunteer for a research study.  It is 
up to you whether you choose to participate or not.  There is no penalty if you 
choose not to participate or discontinue participation.  
• Purpose. The purpose of this research is to develop a multi-criteria-based 
measuring approach to be used in evaluating the maturity of Health Information 
Security at healthcare organizations.   
• Duration. It is expected that your participation will last 20-50 minutes for 
responding to the research questionnaire. The questionnaires will be sent to you 
once or twice between March and August 2020.   
• Procedures and Activities. You will be asked to validate or quantify the 
perspective, criteria, or desirability metrics listed in the research model.   
• Risks. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts of your participation.  
• Benefits. Some of the benefits that may be expected include facilitation of 
follow up research or application or research model on your organization.  
•  Alternatives. Participation is voluntary, the only alternative is to choose not to 
participate.  
 
What happens if I agree to participate?   
If you agree to be in this research, your participation will include serving as one of the experts 
within one or two expert panels, which will help validate and quantify the research model. You 




about any new information that may affect your willingness to continue participation in this 
research.   
What happens to the information collected?   
Information collected for this research will be used to validate and quantify the research model 
or will be used for case study analysis.  The information and analytical results will be 
documented in a PhD dissertation, which will be accessible from the university or from academic 
databases.  Your identifiable information, such as your name, will be kept confidential.  
How will my privacy and data confidentiality be protected?  
We will take measures to protect your privacy including keeping your name and identifiable 
information hidden.  Despite these precautions, we can never fully guarantee the confidentiality 
of all study information.  Individuals and organizations that conduct or monitor this research 
may be permitted access to inspect research records. This may include private information. 
These individuals and organizations include [the Institutional Review Board that reviewed this 
research.   
What if I want to stop participating in this research?  
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, but if you do, 
you may stop at any time. You have the right to choose not to participate in any study 
activity or completely withdraw from participation at any point without penalty or loss 
of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Your decision whether or not to 
participate will not affect your relationship with the researchers or Portland State 
University.   
Will I be paid for participating in this research?  
You will not be paid for participating in this research.   
Who can answer my questions about this research?  
If you have questions, concerns, or have experienced a research related injury, contact the 
research team at:  
Bridget Barnes Page  
(503) 702-7866  
pagebridget@outlook.com or barnesbr@ohsu.edu   
  




The Portland State University Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) is overseeing this research. The 
IRB is a group of people who independently review research studies to ensure the rights and 
welfare of participants are protected. The Office of Research Integrity is the office at Portland 
State University that supports the IRB. If you have questions about your rights, or wish to speak 
with someone other than the research team, you may contact:  
Office of Research Integrity  
PO Box 751  
Portland, OR 97207-0751  
Phone:  (503) 725-5484  
Toll Free:  1 (877) 480-4400  
Email:  psuirb@pdx.edu    
Consent Statement  
I have had the opportunity to read and consider the information in this form. I have asked any 
questions necessary to make a decision about my participation. I understand that I can ask 
additional questions throughout my participation.   
By signing below, I understand that I am volunteering to participate in this research. I 
understand that I am not waiving any legal rights. I have been provided with a copy of this 
consent form. I understand that if my ability to consent for myself changes, either I or my legal 
representative may be asked to provide consent prior to me continuing in the study.   
I consent to participate in this study.    
Name of Adult Participant                               Signature of Adult Participant            Date   
  
Researcher Signature (to be completed at time of informed consent)  
I have explained the research to the participant and answered all of his/her questions. I 
believe that he/she understands the information described in this consent form and 
freely consents to participate.    
Name of Research Team Member     Signature of Research Team Member              Date  




Appendix A-3: Example of web based validation instrument 
 




Appendix A-4: Web based judgment quantification instrument 
 
 












Appendix B: Expert Panels 

















Appendix C: Validation Data  



































Appendix D: Quantification Data Collection Instrument and Data 
Appendix D-1: Quantification of Level 2 (Objectives)* 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 









Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) * 
Appendix D-2-1: Organizational Support Goal 
 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 







Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) * 
Appendix D-2-2: Policies & Standards  Goal 
 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 








Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) * 
Appendix D-2-3: Training & Awareness Goal 
 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 







Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) * 
Appendix D-2-4: Technical Hygiene Goal 
 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 







Appendix D-2: Quantification of Level 3 (Goals) * 
Appendix D-2-5: Mitigation of External Threat Goal 
 
* expert identification information has been removed from the far left hand column 





Appendix D-3: Quantification Data Entry and Analysis Tool 
The HDM 2.0 © software is used to quantify the expert data. This figure below 
shows the interface that experts used to conduct the pair-wise comparison for the 









Appendix E: Desirability Curves Data Collection Tool & Data 




Information Security Maturity Model in Healthcare 
Organizations in the United States 
  
Thank you for participating in evaluating my research model as a subject matter expert. 
 
My research goal is to create a maturity model for information security in healthcare 
organizations.  This model would provide a framework by which healthcare organizations 
may: 
• Assess their information security maturity from multiple perspectives to 
increase self-awareness; and 
• Provide insight on strengths and weaknesses related to specific risk mitigation 
criteria in order to best focus limited resources to improve information 
security within their organizations. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
During this part of the data collection, your assessment of each criterion in the 
model will be used to develop desirability curves, quantifying the elements 
associated with information security maturity. 
________________________________________________________________________ 






 Objective description: 
 
 









Information Security Technical Hygiene 
 
Please provide a metric score from 0 (least favorable state) to 100 (most 
favorable state) for each possible state noted.  
Physical Controls 
What level of physical controls are established at organization?
 




















Appendix E-2: Desirability Curve Definition and Values 
Table E-2-1: Organizational Support – Governance 
 





Table E-2-3: Organizational Support – Resource Availability 
 
Table E-2-4: Organizational Support – Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Disaster 





Table E-2-5: Policies and Standards – Policy Documentation and Awareness 
 
 
















Table E-2-9: Training & Awareness – Communications  
 
 





Table E-2-11: Training & Awareness – Informational Portal 
 
 





Table E-2-13: Training & Awareness – Behavioral Testing and Real-time Teaching 
 
 











































Appendix F: Case Study Data 
Appendix F-1:  Data Collection Instrument 
Healthcare Information Security Maturity Model – Case Study Interview 
Thank you for agreeing to serve as a case study for the healthcare information security 
maturity model which I have developed with the help of subject matter experts from across the 
country.  
Over the next 30 minutes I will ask you a series of questions related to each information 




You will be asked to rate your organization along a spectrum of maturity for each goal within 
the model by answering the question noted below.  As we move through the levels noted below you 
can think of them as advancing – i.e., level “c” is more advanced than level “a”, level “e” is more 
advanced than level “c”.  Please select the BEST answer for your organization, understanding that no 








The first set of questions relate to Organizational Support for information security: 
Governance 
What level of governance for information security is established at your organization? 
a) There is no governance related to information security at organization. 
b) The organization has a limited governance structure related to information security, with 
some defined policies, roles and responsibilities. 
c) The organization has well established policies related to information security as well as 
defined roles and responsibilities. 
d) The organization has well established information security governance which includes 
routine monitoring and measurement of performance associated with a defined strategic 
plan. 
e) The organization has a comprehensive governance structure which includes aligning 
information security strategies to business objectives. 
 
Leadership and management support 
What level of leadership and management support for information security is available at 
organization? 
a) Organizational management and leadership is uninterested in or unaware of information 
security policies, practices, performance. 
b) Organization leaders and managers have some awareness of the need for information 
security and understand their role in supporting information security through policies and 
practices.  
c) Organizational leaders and managers act as model for expectations of behavior related to 
information security best practices. 
d) Organizational leaders and managers are actively engaged in information security 
governance process, policy and procedures, ensuring alignment with business objectives. 
e) Organizational leadership at the highest level receive routine updates regarding information 
security performance across the organization and provide support for information security 
through dedication of resources and personal behaviors. 
 
Resource availability 
What level of access to resources for information security are available at organization? 
a) There are no specific resources dedicated to information security at organization. 
b) There are a few resources available to support information security at the organization, but 
there are no resources dedicated exclusively to information security. 
c) The organization has a dedicated information security team that provides support for 
information security tools. 
d) The organization has a dedicated information security team that supports operational 
information security tools, provides information security training to organizational 
members and conducts routine information security assessments. 
e) There are robust resources committed to information security which allow not only 
maintenance and monitoring of existing system but also consistent improvement in 





Risk assessment, risk management plan, disaster recovery and incident response  
What level of risk assessment, risk management, disaster recovery and incident response 
plans for information security are available at organization? 
a) The organization does not conduct information security risks assessments or have an 
information security risk management plan. 
b) The organization conducts infrequent risk assessments and has not developed a risk 
management plan for information security. 
c) The organization conducts routine risk assessments and has developed a risk management 
plan for information security. 
d) The organization conducts routine risk assessment and has a risk management plan for 
information security that is actively monitored and managed.  The organization also has a 
disaster recovery and/or incident response plan. 
e) The organization conducts routine risk assessments, has a risk management plan for 
information security that is actively monitored and engages with national standards 
organizations to benchmark performance against others.  The organization also has a 
disaster recovery and/or incident response plan. 
 
The next set of questions relate to Policies & Standards for information security: 
 
Policy documentation and awareness 
What level of policy documentation and awareness related to information security is 
established at organization? 
a) The organization has no policy documentation related to information security. 
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security policies. 
c) The organization has well documented policies related to information security but they are 
not well known to organizational members. 
d) The organization has a comprehensive set of information security policies which are 
regularly updated and well understood by members of the organization. 
 
Procedure documentation and awareness 
What level of information security procedure documentation and awareness is established at 
organization? 
a) The organization has no procedure documentation related to information security. 
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security procedures. 
c) The organization has well documented procedures related to information security but they 
are not well known to organizational members. 
d) Organization has a comprehensive set of information security procedures which are 








Technical standard documentation and awareness 
What level of information security procedure documentation and awareness is established at 
organization? 
a) The organization has no technical standards documentation related to information security. 
b) The organization has some documentation related to information security technical 
standards. 
c) The organization has well documented technical standards related to information security 
but they are not well known to organizational members. 
d) Organization has a comprehensive set of technical standards related to information security 
which are regularly updated and well understood by members of the organization. 
 
Sanction documentation and awareness 
What level of sanction documentation and awareness related to information security is 
established at organization? 
a) The organization has no documentation or awareness related to sanctions that may be 
implemented as a result of non-compliance with information security policies. 
b) The organization has some documentation related to sanctions that may be implemented as 
a result of non-compliance with information security policies. 
c) The organization has completed documentation of sanctions that may be implemented as a 
result of non-compliance with information security policies but they are not well known to 
organizational members or are not implemented in an equitable way. 
d) The organization has well documented and broadly known sanctions guidance associated 
with information security policy violations.  The defined sanctions are believed to be fair by 
organizational members and are applied equitably by the organization. 
 
The next set of questions relate to Awareness & Training for information security: 
Communications 
What level of information security communications are established at organization? 
a) The organization does not communicate information about information security threats or 
expectations. 
b) The organization provides limited or inconsistent communication related to information 
security threats and expectations. 
c) The organization provides regular communication through a single channel (e.g., employee 
newsletter) related to information security threats and expectations. 
d) The organization provides regular communication through multiple print or digital channels 
(e.g. newsletters, posters, blogs) but does not create forums for in-person delivery of 
information related to information security threats and expectations. 
e) The organization has dedicated communication resources for information security that 
create and deliver content about the current state of information security, changes to 
information security threats, tools, policies and procedures.  Communication is delivered on 







What level of information security awareness events are established at organization? 
a) The organization does not host information security awareness events. 
b) The organization hosts limited (e.g. small group) or inconsistent security awareness events. 
c) The organization hosts regular security awareness events that are not well known or 
attended by organizational members. 
d) The organization hosts regular security awareness events that are well attended by small 
groups of organizational members. 
e) The organization hosts regular security awareness events.  Some events are uniquely 
designed to appeal to discrete stakeholder types (e.g., web-developers) and others are large 
security awareness events which are well attended by large numbers of organizational 
members.   
 
Information portal 
What level of an information security portal is established at organization? 
a) The organization does not have a digital presence/portal focused on information security as 
part of a broader communication toolkit. 
b) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides limited information (e.g. only 
minimal information regarding information security policies). 
c) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information 
related to information security policies, procedures, sanctions, and tools, but is not well 
known to organizational members. 
d) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information 
related to information security policies, procedures and tools, which is well known to 
organizational members 
e) The organization has a digital presence/portal which provides comprehensive information 
related to information security policies, procedures and tools, and where to get additional 




What level of information security training is established at organization? 
a) The organization provides no training related to information security threats or 
expectations. 
b) The organization provides a single, annual, online training related to information security 
threats and expectations which is optional. 
c) The organization provides annual online training related to information security threats and 
expectations which is mandatory for all organizational members. 
d) The organization provides annual online training related to information security threats and 
expectations which is mandatory for all organizational members.  In addition, the 
organization provides small group training upon request. 
e) The organization provides a combination of computer-based training, small group training, 




and best practices.  The organization proactively identifies individuals and/or groups who 
may need additional ad-hoc training and provides those services regularly.  At least one 
annual training is required of all organizational members. 
 
Behavioral testing and real-time teaching 
What level of information security behavioral testing and real-time teaching is established at 
organization? 
a) The organization provides no behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to information 
security threats or expectations. 
b) The organization provides limited or inconsistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching 
related to information security threats and expectations. 
c) The organization provides consistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to 
information security threats and expectations through a single channel (e.g. phishing) but 
does not share results broadly or shames those organizational members who perform 
poorly. 
d) The organization provides consistent behavioral testing or real-time teaching related to 
information security threats and expectations through multiple channels (e.g. phishing, USB 
drops) but does not share results broadly or shames those organizational members who 
perform poorly. 
e) The organization regularly and frequently tests members compliance with information 
security policies, procedures, best practices.  Tests are conducted through a variety of 
delivery mechanisms (e.g. phishing tests, USB drops).  Results of individual tests are shared 
with individual organizational members in real-time privately to avoid blaming/shaming 
and encourage learning.  Organizational members who repeatedly fail behavioral tests are 
offered personal coaching.  Organization wide performance related to behavioral compliance 
is shared broadly with all members to increase awareness and associated compliance. 
 
The next set of questions relate to Technical Hygiene for information security: 
Physical Controls 
What level of physical controls are established at organization? 
a) The organization has no physical controls that limit access to technology infrastructure 
and/or confidential information.  
b) The organization has some physical controls that limit access to technology infrastructure 
and/or confidential information (e.g., locked doors in some locations, badge access to highly 
sensitive areas).  
c) The organization has comprehensive physical controls that limit access to technology 
infrastructure and/or confidential information.  
d) The organization has comprehensive physical controls that limit access to technology 
infrastructure and/or confidential information which are actively monitored by information 








What level of asset management for physical and virtual technology assets is established at 
organization? 
a) The organization has no tools, processes or staffing to provide asset management 
capabilities for physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software).  
b) The organization has some tools, process or staffing to support limited asset management 
capabilities for physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software).  
c) The organization has tools, processes, and staffing to support asset management for most 
but not all physical and virtual technical assets (hardware and software). 
d) The organization has comprehensive tools, processes and staffing to support full life cycle 
management related to all physical and virtual technology assets (hardware and software). 
 
Routine security updates 
What level of routine information security updating is established at organization? 
a) The organization does not perform routine information security patching/updating. 
b) The organization performs periodic information security patching/updating and may have 
technical tools which aid in identifying required patching. 
c) The organization performs routine information security patching and updating and has 
technical tools which aid in identifying required patching, but often fails to meet patching 
updates as frequently as defined in service level agreements or policies or is unable to patch 
all software, end points, servers, operating systems, bio-medical devices. 
d) The organization has a robust information security patching/updating process in place with 
defined roles and responsibilities to patch all systems and devices across the enterprise.  
Information security patching/updating is completed as defined in service level agreements 
or policies.  
 
Protection of Stored Information and Information in Transit 
What level of projection of stored information and information in transit is established at 
organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to support protection of stored information and 
information in transit. 
b) The organization has some tools to support protection of stored information and 
information in transit. 
c) The organization has comprehensive tools to support stored information and information in 
transit for applications and systems that are on-premise. 
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information 
security professionals to support protection of stored information and information in transit 









Identity/Authentication/Access Management and Monitoring 
What level of identity, authentication, access management and access monitoring is 
established at organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to support identity, authentication or access 
management and monitoring.  
b) The organization has some tools to support authentication and access management 
capabilities.  
c) The organization has some tools to support identity, authentication and access management 
capabilities.  
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information 
security professionals to support identity, authentication and access management in both 
on-premise and cloud-based platforms.   
 
The next set of questions relate to Mitigation of External Threats for information security: 
Data Loss Protection 
What level of data loss protection is established at organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to support data loss protection. 
b) The organization has some tools to support data loss protection. 
c) The organization has comprehensive tools to support data loss protection for applications 
and systems that are on-premise. 
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information 
security professionals to support data loss protection for applications and systems that are 
on-premise as well as cloud-based platforms.   
 
Anti-spam and malware protection 
What level of anti-spam and malware protection is established at organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to provide anti-spam or malware protection 
capabilities.  
b) The organization has some tools to support anti-spam protection capabilities.  
c) The organization has some tools to support both anti-spam and malware protection 
capabilities.  
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information 
security professionals to support both anti-spam and malware protection in both on-
premise and cloud-based platforms.   
 
Intrusion detection and prevention 
What level of intrusion detection and prevention is established at organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to provide intrusion detection and prevention 
capabilities.  
b) The organization has some tools to support intrusion prevention capabilities.  
c) The organization has some tools to support both intrusion prevention and intrusion 




d) The organization has comprehensive tools and staffing to support a 24x7 Intrusion detection 
and prevention (a.k.a. Managed Detection Response) program utilizing a Security 
Information and Event Manage system. 
 
Protection of network 
What level of network protection is established at organization? 
a) The organization has no technical tools to support network protection capabilities. 
b) The organization has a limited set of tools to support network protection capabilities (e.g., 
firewalls, network access control). 
c) The organization has both basic and some advanced tools to support network protection 
capabilities (e.g., firewalls, network access controls, routine vulnerability scanning, network 
segmentation). 
d) The organization has comprehensive tools which are actively monitored by information 
security professionals to support protection of network. 
 
We have now reached the conclusion of the maturity model-based questions.    
Can you share with me what key next steps your organization plans to move forward with or that you 








































Appendix H: Acronyms 
 
